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US POST COLD WAR GRAND STRATEGY AND MULTILATERAL NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND EAST ASIA
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ABSTRACT

East Asian liberal intergovernmental integration is unlikely to occur without formal engagement by the United States. An Asian Union is therefore improbable. The European Union model is not transferrable to East Asia in that the former is a multilateral organization that has emerged that can claim authoritatively to speak for Europe. The Cold War context for European liberal intergovernmental integration included US policies constituting the strategy of containment towards the USSR. US incentives to coordinate west European policies towards the Communist bloc targeted mid-range power allies. These European nation states were roughly equal in their national power capabilities. The USSR did not have the hard or soft power capabilities to claim irrefutable membership in the same European club. Even traditional Russian allies such as Bulgaria have sought affirmation of their European identity through accession to the EU. A similar US-led containment strategy towards China is unlikely. Creation of a multistate Asian regional organization that will persuasively claim to represent Asia in opposition to China is unfeasible. Potential power disparities among East Asia states will be so significant that China cannot be a pole of opposition against which to construct Asia. Pan-regional integration should be Pacific-oriented rather than Asia-focused.

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KEYWORDS: Bulgaria, China, East Asia, European Union, Grand Strategy, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Nationalism, Russia, Soft Power, Trans Pacific Partnership

INTRODUCTION

In Fall 2009, the international media reported Asian agreements to pursue general initiatives for an East Asian-region integration movement with the European Union as its model (“Asian EU,” 2009). These reports highlighted the new Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, as the resuscitator of this proposal (Mulgan, 2009). Disagreements emerged over the envisioned role of the US in Asian integration while China, Japan and South Korea were portrayed to be core prospective members (Brown et al., 2009). While debating which state leadership first made such a proposal, various media commentaries viewed the ASEAN states as candidate members of such an envisioned community (e.g. Xu, 2009). The Hatoyama government fell in June 2010, and Japan then saw a series of short-lived governments that did not follow up on the Asian Union proposal. Meanwhile, in November 2009, US President Barak Obama announced his administration’s support for the Trans Pacific Partnership (Luce et al., 2009). The US joined the TPP negotiations in March 2008, transforming what initially had been a trade pact between Brunei, New Zealand, Chile and Singapore (Trans-Pacific Partnership, 2013). It is now a prospective agreement that also includes Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam and Japan. Japan’s formal accession to the negotiations in July 2013 under Shinzo Abe surprised some observers (Pilling et al., 2013). The formally named Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement raises the question as to the nature and direction of East Asian integration.

A recognizable Asian parallel to the European Union is unlikely. US power and commitment have been critical independent variables shaping the EU’s integration. They will also be critical in shaping East Asian integration, but more so. China’s comparatively much greater hard and soft power capabilities
relative to its neighbors mean that the US must be a formal leader of Asian integration strategies. China’s relative capabilities mean that China cannot be excluded from Asian integration, like the USSR was formally excluded from European integration during the Cold War. On the other hand, these same capabilities require US soft and hard power engagement of China to allow for the potential of Pacific regional integration on the basis of liberal intergovernmental approaches (Buse, 2012: 53). US-led strategic containment of the USSR was a critical factor shaping the environment of European integration. US strategic engagement of China will be necessary if not sufficient for Asian integration, meaning that Asian regional integration must be part of a broader Pacific integration orientation.

This study contributes to the development of the concept of grand strategy within the international relations literature. It presents a comparative analysis of international and state-level trends shaping postwar regional development in two geographic areas. It highlights analytical development of the role of soft power in multilateral integration in relation to regional nationalisms as part of US grand strategy in these two area cases: Europe and East Asia. A theme in this literature is that the US has been pursuing a grand strategy that emphasizes promotion of liberalism since 1945 (Green, 2012: 10, 23-26; Freedman, 2006: 63; Forsythe, 2002: 505-10). The strategy has been characterized as structuring other regimes and their international environment to promote the “democratic peace” among these democratic states (P. Miller, 2012: 49, 63). P. Miller notes that this strategy has not been explicitly adopted by US foreign policy decision makers; rather it is an overall pattern that is inferred by the analyst (2012, 49-50). In this vein, a purpose of this study is to explicate the respective European and East Asian regional implications of long term US foreign policy today, with its roots in the Cold War. As a soft power amenability factor, the authoritative legitimacy of the claim of popular sovereignty via national self-determination has become internalized globally among state elites (Buzan, 2010: 25).

A liberal hegemonic power is more likely to promote self-determination with a soft power emphasis in a multilateral framework when engaged in a defensive strategy against a Great Power challenge (B. Miller, 2012: 33). Different constituencies within a polity, liberal or otherwise, will compete to promote different strategic approaches (B. Miller, 2012: 35, 57-59, 61-62; Tsygankov, 2011: 30-31). They will vary in their defensive versus offensive orientation in their respective advocacy of power application. Concomitantly, these constituencies will support with varying degrees of intensity the international promotion of the liberal hegemon’s political regime ideology. Their advocacy will vary along a continuum between defensive, cautious, multilateral “exemplarism” and offensive, crusading, unilateral “vindicationism.” Their variation along this continuum will reflect the intensity of the perceived challenge these constituencies see to the liberal hegemon as well as their respective functional organizational roles in the polity (B. Miller, 2012: 33-34). A conceptualization of nationalism for a focus on its critical role in determining the efficacy of soft power application in grand strategy is necessary. This study utilizes the theoretical framework for nationalism developed by Martha L. and Richard W. Cottam that applies findings from social psychology (2001). National self-determination is a manifestation of a national group’s collective motivation for national in-group self-assertion in the world community. Nationalism manifests different patterns of collective perception of self and other in different political contexts with consequent derivative systematic policy behavioral patterns. Satisfying this national self-determination need is critical for effective soft power capability in great power grand strategy.

This comparative analysis first begins with an explication of the relevance of nationalism to the substance of soft power during the Cold War and its implications for the Trans Pacific Partnership. Earlier, the US had success in generating pro-US political trends in European perceptions and attitudes through US support for European integration. This US support occurred within the context of the US containment strategy towards the USSR and its Warsaw Pact satellites perceived as threatening European national self-determination. Yet US Cold War strategic policy tended to assume that radical Third World nationalistic movements were more vulnerable to Soviet subordination, resulting at times in disastrous outcomes as in Southeast Asia. The second section focuses more closely on the European Union’s institutional
accommodations to European national self-determination aspirations. It includes an analysis of traditionally pro-Russian Bulgaria as a case study. The third section critiques the applicability of the lessons drawn from the successes of European integration to a prospective East Asian integration project. It focuses on the challenge of China’s preponderant regional hard and soft power potential capability following a modern history of self-perceived national humiliation by external and regional actors. The fourth section illustrates the inappropriateness of a reformulation and application of the US Cold War containment strategy in Europe towards China. Such a strategy is less likely to promote East Asian integration as a political byproduct as it did in Europe. Yet, due to regional power disparities, US leadership will be necessary, if not sufficient, to permit the potential for peaceful regional integration. This integration should be expanded to the Pacific to include formally the US rather than limited to East Asia. The fifth section underlines that the political roots of US policy towards Asia lie in the Cold War.

The US containment strategy towards the USSR supported opportunities for China to become a de facto US ally in the 1970s. The resultant integration of China into the global capitalist production chain generated interdependencies hindering the emergence of a new US containment strategy in response to China’s post Cold War rise. Asian regional nationalist resentments lingering from the age of Western and Japanese imperialism that were subdued during the Cold War have reemerged. They also complicate prospective efforts to establish multilateral regional security frameworks supportive of economic and political integration. The sixth section critiques the strategic policy inclinations of the US G.W. Bush and Obama administrations in terms of their respective assumptions regarding Chinese foreign policy motivation. It highlights the danger of a China-US conflict spiral due to mutual suspicion regarding each other’s ultimate regional objectives and draws consequent policy recommendations. While suspicion prevails in Beijing regarding US willingness to recognize China’s global national dignity equality status, the intensification of national grandeur as a motivation is a possibility. The last section concludes that opportunities are greater for US accommodation of China’s rise within a Pacific regional framework than they have been towards post Soviet Russia in Europe. The founding, deepening and widening of post 1945 European integration continues to exploit the political opportunities that the US containment strategy towards the USSR generated. A greater potential exists for promotion of post Cold War Pacific integration under US leadership with less functional emphasis on responding to a perceived challenge from a common enemy. Of course, state leaders particularly in the US must have the acumen to exploit these opportunities while avoiding the potential conflict spiral pitfalls.

Nationalism and Integration

Regional integration institutions confront state foreign policy unilateralism (Beeson et al., 2010). The prevailing, but not the sole, view in Washington, DC is that US-led containment successfully countered a militantly imperialist Soviet Union. Containment’s primary assumption was that the USSR was in effect a Russian version of Nazi Germany (Bush, 2001). Consequently, American-led European multilateral regional institutions today are seen in Washington and Europe as instruments for peace and prosperity. In Europe, the US was generally allied with respective national self-determination impetuses opposed to Soviet domination during the Cold War. In the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia, however, US containment strategy during the Cold War often placed the US in opposition to nationalist movements. The US defeat in Vietnam was due to the US opposition to pan-Vietnamese nationalism. In the Middle East, the US has opposed pan-Arabism and pan-Islamist movements but allied with Zionism during and after the Cold War. Much discussion has circulated in the last decade about the relevance of soft power and US advantages in this regard (Nye, 2007). The use of soft power is an appeal to public opinion, and public opinion cannot be understood in the modern era without an understanding of nationalism. To the extent that the US is perceived as allied with target public national self-determination aspirations, then it will have a soft power advantage. To the extent that it is seen as hostile to national self-determination, then it will lose soft power effectiveness in its policies. The US promotion of the
Trans Pacific Partnership trade liberalization initiative with itself as the lead power within it may be critiqued in these terms (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2012).

Regional integration efforts have to accommodate national self-determination demands. As the US is playing a leading role in these regional integration initiatives, it uses them to pursue its foreign policy objectives. The EU is a model for regional integration proposals such as the African Union and the proposed Asian Union (Xu, 2009). Firstly, an appropriate conceptualization of the nature of the relationship of the US to EU integration during and after the Cold War is necessary. Secondly, the relationship of the US to China is another critical focus. Asian integration efforts confront a China in which much suspicion exists that the US and its allies see China as an upstart threat and see the TPP in this context (Global Times, 2013). Washington’s perception of challenge from China is not now as intense as it was regarding the USSR. The US is likely to have soft power advantages that it can institutionalize through supporting Pacific integration, as it did in Europe. The US, however, will be unable to copy the European model of integration to an East Asian model. China’s power capabilities prevent the construction of an Asian political community in a manner parallel to the construction of a European community heretofore excluding Moscow. Chinese capabilities include its own soft power appeal as the historical political center of Asian Confucian civilization (Kang, 2010). The US therefore supports a broader Pacific regional integration approach that includes it in the form of the Trans Pacific Partnership.

European Nations and European Integration

One popular introductory textbook on the European Union labels liberal intergovernmentalism as the predominant theoretical framework for conceptualizing European integration (Dinan, 2012: 24). An explanation for the mutual cooperation of nation states within a liberal framework requires an appropriate theory of nationalism to analyze it. The group political psychological approach utilized here, developed by Cottam and Cottam (2001), provides a useful conceptualization of nationalism. It explains this behavior in terms of European Union membership having a foundation in soft power appeal to mainstream nationalist public opinion among the peoples of Europe. This soft power appeal derives from European integration appearing to validate the perception that the European nations west of Russia are not under any particular national domination. This perceptual assumption prevails significantly due to success in creating persuasive EU institutional safeguards. These policy-making mechanisms prevent the coalescence of public perceptions of EU systematic biases favoring the influence of particular nation states over EU policy-making processes. It generates this powerful perception of the existence of equal national sovereignty despite obvious cultural, economic and political power potential differences among the peoples of Europe. Cottam and Cottam describe this psychological strategy for integration as promoting “social creativity” in national collective intergroup perception of self and other (2001, 266).

The nations of Europe are different while not under particular national domination, or in positive terms, they are different but equal. Today, Europe is predominantly equated with the European Union (e.g. Jacobs, 2012). The EU has so far avoided mass public perceptual equation of national cultural differences with a solid and immutable status hierarchy among its member states. The institutions of European Union policy making help support these collective perceptual psychological adaptation strategies towards national acquiescence to EU integration. They do so despite the wide range in power capabilities among the 28 EU member states (Nugent, 2010: 289-306). “[T]here are often no clear lines of authority or hierarchy between the different levels” of EU policy making (Nugent, 2010: 291). These institutions are necessary for the economic and political liberalism-based approaches for European cooperation and integration. In sum, liberal intergovernmentalism in Europe has its basis in the mainstream predominant view among the respective national publics that they differ in their relative power capabilities. Yet they are not under national domination by one or an alliance of other nations. Maintenance of this prevailing perception is necessary for European integration to develop.
The Cold War conflict from the late 1940s until the early 1990s supported this social creativity collective perceptual outlook. The Cold War conflict functionally incentivized social creativity in European national collective perception of self and other. This incentive lay in the different European nations west of Russia to different degrees perceptually sharing a common adversary in Soviet Russia. In other words, the enemy of my enemy is my friend/ally (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 96-100). The decline and end of the Cold War generated additional challenges for liberal intergovernmentalism. EU Economic and Monetary Union builds more heavily on economic and governmental bureaucratic vested interests to continue the integration approach. Yet the shared perceived challenge from Russia continues (“How do you solve a problem like Russia?,” 2013).

Bulgaria: Balkan National Identity in Transition within Euro-Atlantic Hegemony

A political psychological approach to nationalism as a motivational political value helps illuminate the meaning of creating a modern European state in post Communist Eastern Europe (Hajdinjak et al., 2012). The case presented is a former Soviet client state, Bulgaria. (Hajdinjak et al. state that “[t]he project was funded by the Seventh Framework Program of the European Commission (FP7 2007-2013) […]”). This study applies Cottam and Cottam’s theory of group image stereotypes towards perceived sources of challenge to the national in-group. Behavioral predispositions and consequent political strategies associate with these stereotypes. The emotive force of individual or collective political behavior that associates with nationalism derives not primarily from the appeal of an ideology. It derives from the deep emotional commitment that individuals and groups have towards defending the positive image that they aim to maintain of their nation. Their nation is their primary, terminal self-identification in-group, which may or may not correspond with the state borders in which they find themselves placed. They tend to associate the status of the in-group with their own status. Perceived challenges regarding the comparative social status of the national in-group are more likely to be taken as perceived slights to oneself (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 1-4). The perspective taken is that of an in-group responding to a negative social self-comparison towards an out-group, e.g. Bulgarians’ collective self-image in relation to West Europe.

The in-group may choose to respond psychologically in different ways. Between actors perceived as relative power equals, “social competition” refers to direct competition between groups for status and influence. In intense, zero-sum conflict situations, one side’s observed gain in influence and status is perceived as the other side’s loss (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 92-93). Political conflicts may be intrastate, as in ethnic civil war situations, as well as in the global political system, as in full-scale war (hot or cold) situations. Social creativity strategies aim to preserve a positive group self-image through creating a collective perceptual reality in which different, equally valid yardsticks for evaluation apply to different groups, i.e. different but equal. “Social mobility” strategies refer to seeking to join and assimilate into the perceived, “superior” out-group (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 92, 267).

Euro-Atlantic integration aims at promoting integration through social mobility and social creativity in perception of self and other. Social mobility refers here to Europe as a perceived area of individual career and group opportunity and national economic development. Particularly in Eastern Europe, these possibilities emerge through willing amalgamation into the perceived, more advanced pan-European community through policies of soft power cooptation (Nye, 2007: 391). Social creativity refers here to the promotion of the perception and attitude through European Union public policy of national-ethnic groups in Europe as different but equal. The evaluation relates to their perceived comparative social status in Europe (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 87-122). Among the traditional great power nation states of Europe having comparable power capability, Germans are classified/stereotyped to be more methodically effective. The French are classified/stereotyped for their superior logical incisiveness. The Italians are classified/stereotyped for their superior emotive communication skills, etc. All are supposedly equally appreciated and valued in the European Union contextual community (Lewis, 2006). Lewis (2006) is an
example of the subfield in the strategic management literature that focuses on the weaknesses and, of course, strengths, of different national cultures. Consequently, European integration may be conceptualized as a peace strategy. In other words, it aims to eliminate conditions conducive for the occurrence of national social competition in the European region. The relative power equality among European higher power states is a keystone for this necessary approach. Pro-Euro-Atlantic Bulgarian political formations view Euro-Atlantic structures more in accordance with the “ally” perceptual ideal stereotype. The jointly-shared sources of perceived threat stem from overt and covert challengers (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 96-98, 100). Overt challengers may be perceived excessive Russian governmental influence. Covert challengers may include perceived subversive informal political economic structures. They include informal intelligence and organized crime structures deriving from regional networks that originally developed during Communism. These domestic informal Bulgarian structures are under suspicion of continuing cooperation with international counterparts in Russia and elsewhere.

Historically, imperial powers such as Russia/Soviet Union have viewed Bulgaria more in accordance with the “colonial/client” stereotype (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 96-98, 100, 118-21). For example, Russian President Boris Yeltsin presumed Bulgaria to have a special relationship with Russia. He described Bulgaria as a potential candidate to join a new, post-Soviet “quadrilateral community” integration agreement between Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Dr. Zhelu Zhelev, the Bulgarian President and leader of the pro-Euro-Atlantic, Union of Democratic Forces party, as well as the post-Communist, Socialist party government under Prime Minister Zhan Videnov, formally rejected Boris Yeltsin’s public invitation. While they protested against Yeltsin’s presumption, demonstrations occurred in Sofia against Yeltsin’s comment (“Bulgaria Will Present a Note to Russia on President Yeltsin’s Statement,” 1996; “Bulgarian Ambassador in Russia Delivers Verbal Note,” 1996; “Southeastern Europe: Bulgarian Political Roundup,” 1996). Bulgaria joined the EU on January 1, 2007 (“Bulgaria in EU: Ode to Joy,” 2006).

**Communist Bulgaria: The Closest Ally of the USSR**

The Soviet authorities considered the People’s Republic of Bulgaria its closest ally, seeing Bulgaria as most willing to copy Soviet policy models (“Former Friends,” 2001). The totalitarian, political economic component of Soviet imperialism left a comparatively stronger ideological-attitudinal legacy in Bulgaria. This legacy also interacted with the earlier collective memory of Slavic Orthodox Russia’s critical role in Slavic Orthodox Bulgarian national liberation in 1877-1878 from the Ottoman empire. Bulgaria had been part of this Muslim empire for five centuries. An informal reference to Russia among Bulgarians today remains Big Brother Ivan. During 1944-89, Bulgaria as a client state of Moscow underwent a period of rapid, forced economic, social and political change under a Communist totalitarian regime. This change can be labeled modernization depending on the indicators that one may choose, but Bulgaria did rapidly change. During this same period, the People’s Republic of Bulgaria acquired a reputation as the closest ally of the USSR in the Warsaw Pact, twice applying to join the USSR (Dyer, 2009; Katsikas, 2012: 5-6, 19). A prominent Russian concern is that the EU’s “Eastern Partnership” program is a strategic effort to reduce Moscow’s influence in the territories of the former Soviet republics (Clover, 2009; Kramer, 2013). Moscow’s suspicions undoubtedly receive confirmation from certain media reports. They highlight unofficial EU leadership warnings that failure to improve Bulgaria-EU cooperation may result in a strengthening of Russian influence in Bulgaria. Bulgaria’s ties to the EU are portrayed as threatened by Bulgarian governmental inefficacy in combating pervasive corruption (Barber, 2009).

Bulgaria’s European integration interacts with its collective historical legacy of domination by others. Bulgaria’s history has led the Bulgarian polity collectively to tend to see threats from Great Power actors historically perceived as superior both in capability and cultural level: the imperial image. Internalization through socialization of the inferior, colonial/client self-image can be the basis of modern, neo-colonial relationship with an imperial power (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 91-92, 97, 99, 111-16, 118-20, 273-74).
In addition to 500 years of Ottoman control, the contemporary Bulgarian state itself had much of its foundations laid under the “Sultanism” of the decades long Soviet client dictatorship of Todor Zhivkov (e.g. Eke et al., 2000: esp. 531).

These stereotypes of self and other decay in the current post Communist and post colonial development phase of the Bulgarian national community. The process of decay is likely to manifest itself in social tendencies including nationalistic political self-realization movements articulating social and political justice demands (e.g. Zubok et al., 2011: esp. 33-38). These movements may be led by an alternative set of aspiring ruling elite. In sum, one should expect to see militant nationalistic behavior in post-1989 Bulgarian democratic politics. It would likely pose a challenge to the relatively peaceful relations that have been maintained between the Bulgarian Orthodox majority and the Muslim, Turkish and Roma minorities since 1989. More intense affirmation of national in-group identity increases the propensity for the members of the in-group to find social causality for their dissatisfaction by blaming out-groups for society’s problems. A negative stereotype of that group may promulgate on a wide scale, i.e. scapegoating (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 73). European Union external intervention serves to promote opportunities for social mobility and social creativity as means of conflict resolution within Bulgaria and the Balkans. This intervention is being put to the test in the midst of the radical ongoing change processes in Bulgarian societal authority norms (Tsolova, 2013).

Challenges to East Asian Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Liberal intergovernmentalism in social creativity strategies in Asia faces particular challenges that have been less prominent in Europe. The power potential base differential between China and the rest of Asia is the most important factor (Cottam et al., 1978). China’s globally superlative power potential base is evident for all to see. The most powerful West European nations are roughly comparable in power capability. This awareness stems from the number of costly failures to establish hegemony over Europe by a European state at least since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Moreover, unlike the predominance of comparatively homogenous nation states in Europe, a number of states in Asia are not nation states. Their populations consist of multiethnic communities within more or less arbitrarily created state territorial boundaries drawn by former European imperial powers. Nation states like China, Vietnam and Japan are not typical. The existence of nations as state political communities represented by their respective governmental apparatuses underpins European liberal intergovernmentalism. In Asia, China has 20% of the world’s population, 94% of which belongs to the Han ethnic group (Levinson, 1998: viii). They tend to view themselves as members of a political community many centuries old despite great cultural diversity within the Han core group (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 83-84). Other such cases are not typical: e.g. Japan, Vietnam, and Korea (still bifurcated). India and Pakistan are also in the multiethnic category. The assumption of relative equal power capabilities is harder to maintain cognitively and perceptually in Asia. Comparisons are made between the rise of China and the rise of Imperial Germany beginning in the late 19th century in terms of significance for international peace and stability (Liao, 2010; Evans-Pritchard, 2013). Newly-unified Imperial Germany’s immediate geographic environment included other, established Great Powers. China, on the other hand, is in effect a civilization pretending to be a state according to the oft-repeated observation of Lucian W. Pye (Zhang, 2011; Pye, 1990). Its humiliation by Japan and the European powers is understood as occurring during a comparatively brief period within the millennia of history during which China was paramount. Hostility to imperialism became a defining feature of modern Chinese nation-state identity (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 84).

In sum, scholars debate over whether or not US hegemony has been necessary to create a permissive environment for postwar European integration (Schmidt, 2008: 272-73). In East Asia, for liberal intergovernmentalism to succeed, it is less likely to be effective if led by the East Asian actors themselves. This political context of much greater state power inequality makes US regional leadership a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for it to occur. US leadership can override the security dilemma in
Asia and provide the national security public goods that will allow the serious possibility for liberal intergovernmentalism (Dong, 2013). Germany’s defeat in two world wars established that Germany did not have the power capability to integrate Europe within an imperial status hierarchy with Germany at the pinnacle. China is rapidly becoming a developed nation state. That the Chinese authorities would be convinced that China is not the naturally preeminent power in Asia, solely by comparison with the power capabilities of only its geographic neighbors, is unlikely.

The comparatively overwhelming power capability base of China in East Asia makes prospective Cold War-type containment of a belligerent Chinese government especially problematic. The Chinese authorities have achieved relatively intensive integration into the global capitalist economy in comparison with the USSR. These facts make the US adoption of an accommodation strategy more likely. Currie suggests such a strategy may risk re-enacting the failure of “appeasement” now in the form of the Obama administration’s “strategic reassurance” of China (2009). An appeasement strategy should not be seen automatically as a recipe for disaster today because of the history leading to the outbreak of what become the Second World War (Mckercher, 2008: 411, 14, 423-24). Layne highlights neoclassical realism’s emphasis on the particularity of German domestic political and individual (i.e. Hitler) factors in an appropriate critique of the UK’s “appeasement” strategy (2008, 401). Layne places his position in contrast to the excessive focus in structural realism/neorealism, the predominant paradigm in Cold War international relations theory, on international political systemic factors. Neorealist approaches focus on the shifting international balance of power among European states in the 1930s (Ibid.). A policy-relevant, useful critique of 1930s UK grand strategy or the grand strategy of any state at any time must give equal weight to other factors at the state and individual decision-maker levels of analysis. An accurate assessment of interacting domestic and international political dynamics shaping Chinese foreign policy motivation are necessary to determine the appropriate strategic responses to China’s rise. Nationalism is a critical state-level factor shaping the behavior of regional and external state actors in East Asia.

Regional Identity and International Multilateralism

Containing China is problematic because China’s disproportionate power capability makes conceptual construction of Asia as a civilization distinct from China cognitively improbable. In contrast, few would argue that a European political identity is not conceivable without Russia as a critical component of it. This point highlights that successful soft power strategies in Europe accommodate national component communities who are roughly comparable in terms of their respective power potential bases. China, by contrast, does not have viable potential Asian competitors that can mandate accommodation. Rather, China’s main self-evaluation yardstick is likely to be other global powers, such as the US, or more broadly, the West. The European Union has become equated with Europe and being European as the Bulgarian case illustrates. No such organization exists in Asia that Asians seek to join to prove themselves Asian. Being Asian is not a goal of social mobility and creativity as is being European by joining the EU. Europe consisted of most of the leading powers in world affairs until the end of World War II. The reconstitution of Europe has happened under the hegemonic dominance of a European descendant polity, the United States. Two of the major power victors in World War II and the Cold War are also located in west Europe. As the form of the Western alliance during the Cold War, the North Atlantic Community appears to be the core of a civilization espousing economic and political liberalism for the West (Huntington 1993).

The apparent alliance of Euro-Atlantic structures with national self-determination aspirations of European nations helped solidify this appeal. Soviet Communism in East Europe initially generated significant appeal particularly among lower socio-economic classes experiencing rapid social mobility (Parkin 1969). As economic development slowed and stagnated, the costs of Communism and Soviet authoritarian hegemony became more apparent as well as resented. West Europe’s apparent postwar success won the battle for association in the mind of world observers to represent European national aspirations. The cost
of American hegemony for most of the peoples of Europe did not appear high. Exceptions include Serbia and its frustration by US-led NATO of its efforts to undo Tito’s dispersal of much of the Serb population and claimed territory among neighboring Yugoslav federal entities (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 219-20). The Russian empire also had a disproportionate potential power base. Historically, the Russian authorities attempted modernization by adopting prevailing west European norms and technologies since at least Peter the Great (Massie 1981). Today, modernization in Europe has become equated with Europeanization, and Europeanization means joining the EU (Anastasakis, 2005: 79).

The Soviet authorities sought to legitimate their policies as achieving modernization by improving upon Western models through application of a superior Marxist social scientific paradigmatic framework (Sakwa, 2013: 79). The Russian empire’s relative potential power differential advantage over its neighbors was never as great as China’s in spite of what it could have become. Certainly this potential was recognized. One of the contributing factors to the outbreak of the First World War was the concern of the German imperial authorities that waiting would only allow more time for the Russian empire to strengthen [Jarausch, 2012 (1969): 53]. China’s modern era great power competitors in East Asia, however, were not serious threats until the nineteenth century. The expansion of Russia, the rise of Japan and the arrival of European imperialism then led to a period that the authorities perceive today as one of national humiliation (Carlson, 2009: 22; Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 84). In the pre-modern era, China was the cultural, political and economic center of its periphery states in the eyes of itself and of the rest of the region until the nineteenth century (Kim, 2013: 236-37). A comparable regional status hierarchy had not existed in Europe for many generations. Kim notes that East Asia as a social identity is a construct of Western Europe as part of “orientalism.” It had not been utilized by East Asians until their contact with European imperialism. “Historically, East Asia, unlike Europe, has never been unified by one empire or one history” (Kim, 2013: 235). Intra-European state mid-range general power equality facilitated the predominance of American influence in west Europe since World War II.

Meanwhile, internal US constituency cultural attachments of varying degrees of intensity with Europe were useful for European diaspora lobbying in the US foreign policy process (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 23-24; Ambrosio, 2001: 151). The US has provided strong political support for postwar European integration (Burgess, 2011: 6). Jean Monnet and his collaborators were ultimately successful in launching the creation of Europe as an integrating political community that had not existed previously (Burgess, 2011: 8). In doing so, they acted upon their aspiration to reestablish Europe’s leading role in the world that Europe had lost because of its internal divisions. Their aim was a political one but also a moral aspiration to begin to change the nature of global international relations (Burgess, 2011: 14-15). Clearly, the task they faced had one of its foundations in the partition of Europe, including core nation states of roughly equal power capability. As yet in Asia, no similar organization representing Asian identity national dignity aspirations exists. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) represents the national aspirations of Southeast Asian state communities to achieve development and secure independence. China’s rise is a source of opportunity for the former and increasingly a possible source of threat to the latter. ASEAN may not be so perceptually appealing to national groups such as Japan and Korea, who see themselves as descendants of political communities that have existed for millennia. The borders of most ASEAN states, by contrast, were drawn by European imperial powers. ASEAN is not likely to become the core of an organization representing the national dignity aspirations of the peoples of Asia seeking proof of their Asian identity.

The EU represents the capability to represent the liberal reconstitution and coordination of core European nation states with American power underwriting it (Herszenhorn, 2013). ASEAN does not have the soft or hard power potential to make such a plausible claim on behalf of the East Asian region. Partly because of this power capability, Moscow perceives the EU as a significant threatening challenge to its regional role and aspirations in Ukraine and elsewhere (e.g. Markov 2014). Beijing does not view ASEAN per se as a threatening challenge (“ASEAN-China Free Trade Area,” 2013). Rather, its ultimate
focus is on the US and the US’ allies in the US “hub-and-spokes” regional alliance system (Cha, 2009: 158). In contrast to Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, China’s regional and global hard and soft power capabilities will prevent such a parallel formation of regional identity-based containment. Asian organizations emerging to play a containment role towards China are unlikely (Solis, 2013a).

US Strategy Towards East Asia

Cold War Roots of US Accommodation of China

A containment strategy assumes that a revisionist state actor needs imperialist expansion to satisfy national grandeur motivations (Cottam, 1977: 115). The latter are a basis for the control system relationship between the authorities and the public. By blocking efforts at imperial expansion despite costly efforts by the aggressive state, the aggressive state regime will face domestic political pressure to change. With the inability to generate adequate domestic control through public appeals to national grandeur sympathies through imperial expansion, the authorities will have to modify the regime. More emphasis on societal material quality of life will require satisfying the utilitarian economic and political participation needs. These goals in turn mandate integration into international trade and financial flows that obviate against radical international revisionism.

The integration of China into international capitalist trade and financial networks is a fundamental differentiation between China, on the one hand, and the old USSR, on the other. In the US prevailing view, Russia is the successor state to the perceived revisionist imperialist state, the USSR. US policy reflects the assumptions prevalent among US policy makers that Moscow aims to reconstitute its first rank power status in world affairs (Roberts, 2013; Tsygankov, 2011). Russia is on probation as the willing successor state to the former USSR. China switched sides during the Cold War to join with the US and its allies. China enjoys greater tolerance in the US in granting leeway to it in imputing non-aggressive motivations for its foreign policy. China allied with the US during a period of intensifying nationalist discontent in the US towards the end of the 1970s. It was evident in the election of Ronald Reagan as US president in 1980 by defeating the incumbent, Jimmy Carter (Howison, 2014: 88-112). Consequently, China acquired an association in the collective imagination of the US with the US’ resurgence. In this perspective, the late term Carter administration adopted a more confrontational approach towards the USSR. It did so especially following its invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, occurring in the midst of the on-going US humiliation during the Iranian hostage crisis.

The Reagan administration intensified this US challenge to the USSR. In the view of the typical Cold Warrior, this US challenge led to the Soviet capitulation that the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev embodied. The prevailing view within the G.H.W. Bush administration was that his “New Thinking” in foreign affairs, along with “glasnost” and “perestroika” domestically, were ultimately Soviet responses to American containment (Brooks et al. 2004). The USSR was unable to meet the American challenge, and so it sought a new, cooperative relationship with the West. The Reagan administration’s proposal for a space-based missile defense system, the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars” in the media) supposedly exemplified this challenge. In this view, US national will and determination during the Reagan administration caused the Soviet Union metaphorically to wave a white flag.

The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union led to far-reaching international changes as well as revolutionary changes domestically in the former Communist countries. China, however, was at this point on the winning side. China became associated with the winning end game of the Cold War, while integrating itself into global capitalist trade patterns. Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the US occurred on January 29 – February 4, 1979 (Embassy of the United States). It occurred less than four years after the denouement to the US national humiliation by Vietnam with the fall of Saigon on April 30, 1975. It also began less than 2 months before China launched its punitive
border war against Vietnam for its occupation of Cambodia. Nearly 11 months later, the Soviet Union launched its military invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979. On the one hand, Soviet motivations may have been primarily defensive in removing an incompetent Soviet client government in Kabul. In this view, President Hafizullah Amin was losing ground to an externally-supported Muslim-led insurgency threatening to destabilize USSR’s Central Asian republics (MacEachin, 2008). On the other hand, Soviet motivations may have been primarily aggressive to exploit American weakness in neighboring Iran to advance towards the Middle East (e.g. PBS, 2006). The prevailing view in Washington was the latter, and China was an ally in opposing the growing Soviet threat to US interests in the Middle East.

US Post Cold War Strategy Towards East Asia

In Europe, the US played an important background role in the creation of the conditions for European integration while leading a containment strategy towards the USSR (Burgess, 2011: 8). In Asia, the US should play a leadership role in promoting Asian integration. The application of US power and influence is necessary, if not sufficient, for satisfying Chinese national dignity demands while restraining the potential for growing Chinese national grandeur demands. Asian integration is less likely to happen on the basis of social creativity approaches among Asian peoples alone. Non-Chinese states are more likely to be stereotyped as historically being tributary states to China or as legacies of European imperialism. They are less likely to be accepted by the Chinese authorities as different but equal to a China that accepts this equality among national differentiation. Therefore, successful liberal regional Asian integration will require external involvement. The TPP can help generate this political potential for US grand strategy. An integration strategy towards China assuaging Chinese national dignity demands, i.e. a “strategic reassurance” strategy, should follow (Osnos, 2009).

Note that the US is not publicly pressuring Japan to increase its military spending. The response to the perceived rising challenge from China has been to harness Japanese polity economic interests to attract the rest of Asia. It does so by avoiding a reckless intensification of perception of challenge within the Chinese government that would be a consequence of a marked Japanese increase in its military spending. Japan has heretofore consistently avoided increasing its military spending above 1% of GNP (World Bank). This is notably lower than the European Union average in 2010 of 1.6% of EU GNP (European Defence Agency, 2012). The latter figure factors in the expenditures for those small EU member states that free ride on the security public goods provided by the large EU member states. Media reports note that the US regularly pressures its European allies to increase their defense spending (Vandiver 2013). The evolving US national security strategy in Asia continues to emphasize its own leadership role. It emphasizes using Japanese economic establishment interests to promote economic and political change within the Chinese polity. The result is more of an accommodation strategy towards China while aiming to strengthen politically the more cooperative elements of the Chinese polity through their vested international business interests.

A role exists for the Trans Pacific Partnership potentially in this new national security strategy of the US and Japan for a rising, authoritarian one-party capitalist China. The US again is using Japan, China’s largest trade partner, as a power multiplier (Owen, 2012). US strategy may be characterized as relying on the strength and size of the Japanese business community to incentivize continued Chinese cooperation. This cooperative development may contribute to eventual political liberalization under pressure from a globalized Chinese business community. The Chinese authorities want economic development for the well being of their people, but also for national power and dignity. In this sense, the US appears to be emphasizing more of an accommodation-type strategy to China’s demands for respect and equal treatment in what is now a global capitalist economic world. Note that the US government criticized Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s December 2013 visit to the Yasukuni shrine which many East Asians view as a symbol of Japanese imperialism (Hayashi, 2014)
The context for East Asian integration in the midst of security and border disputes includes the notable absence of existing conflicts between Russia and China. This silence is significant considering the brief but intense border war in 1969 between the two countries (Pereltsvaig, 2012). Large-scale border fighting over Damansky/Zhenbao Island and the Ussuri river border between China and the USSR resulted in heavy casualties (Pravda.ru, 2009). Despite the evident weakening of Moscow with the collapse of the USSR, this old, violent conflict issue remains closed. Since 2008, these boundary issues have been formally resolved (BBC, 2008).

This significant case of negative evidence implies that China’s current contentious territorial claims ultimately have the US as the ultimate, context-determining target. Specifically, the US is viewed in effect as a challenge to Chinese national dignity needs (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 127-30). Consequently, an accommodation strategy, recently termed “strategic reassurance,” is likely to be more effective in responding to the Chinese challenge (Currie, 2009). Unlike the prevailing view in Washington regarding Soviet foreign policy motivations, China is not primarily motivated by national grandeur, not to mention ideological messianism. Chinese behavior seeks recognition through confirmation of its equal status with the US within the international system.

Dunne argues that recognition indicates the existence of a social practice, because recognition is fundamental to an identity relationship. China was denied sovereign statehood until January 1942, when Western states finally renounced the unequal treaties. Membership in international society in the nineteenth century was determined by a “standard of civilization.” It set conditions for internal governance that corresponded with European beliefs and values. China was therefore part of the states system from the Treaty of Nanking in 1843 until 1942, but it was not a member of international society (2008, 272). This point is noteworthy regarding the foreign policy motivation of satisfying national dignity demands (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 127-30). Indeed, it is a perspective that highlights national dignity as a primary motivation for international relations for a government authority that attempts to claim that it represents a nation.

National dignity struggles may include spiral conflicts that have at their root a demand for equal prerogatives that are equated with equal treatment. However other actors may (mis)interpret these policies as imperialism/revisionism. Consequently, the English School in the academic field of international relations is seeking to understand the roots of a particular category of international conflict (Dunne, 2008). Historical examples include the outbreak of World War I, in which a rising imperial Germany acted belligerently to obtain equal status in international relations through acquisition of imperial possessions. Germany’s belligerency was (mis)interpreted by its opponents as an indication of German radical revisionist/imperialist intentions (Murray, 2010: 658). Comparison of the lead up to World War I with China’s rise and the reaction of the US and its allies, depending largely upon their interpretation of China’s motivations, has been a theme in political commentary (Blumenthal, 2009; Abe, 2014).

Given the improbability of creating an Asian identity club from which China may be excluded, a containment strategy towards a China perceived as aggressive is likely to lack a useful tool. The option of cultural containment will be less likely available to the US and its Asian allies towards China than it was towards the USSR. Indeed, George Kennan at the beginning of the Cold War had advocated US soft power appeal as an emphasis in containment of the USSR in the competition for world influence (Kennan 1947). Moreover, the US’ west European allies during the latter Cold War era were willing to become economically interdependent with the USSR, despite the Soviet SS-20 and US Pershing II nuclear missile upgrades (Tanner 1983). Western Europe imported large amounts of Soviet fossil fuels, notably natural gas through pipelines, while the US exported large amounts of agricultural products to the USSR. The Cold War had embedded itself into the American national security establishment during the first 20 years after World War II. It would continue to be a source of symbolic attention for the next 20 years, but American policy actions belie the intensity implied by American rhetoric. American agricultural exports
dropped after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but they resumed after the Reagan administration assumed office in 1981 (“Afghan Boycott”). This inconsistent behavior highlights the challenge of reevaluating assumptions regarding ultimate foreign policy motivations while old assumptions have become institutionalized. The People’s Republic of China, on the other hand, has ensconced itself into the business strategies of thousands of American multinational corporations as part of the global production chain (Deloitte 2013). China’s advocates in Washington therefore include far more American multinational corporations, which do not take China’s communism as a threat to their investments.

For these reasons, China is far more unlikely to emerge as a perceived, unifying threat to the interests of the dominant components of the American establishment. For all of these reasons, an assertive China, in other words, is not likely to lead to Asian integration parallel to the European process with a foundation in American commitment to containment. As already noted, an additional factor exists that obstructs incentives for intra US alliance Asian coordination towards China in contrast to west Europe. This obstacle consists of regional suspicions regarding Japanese foreign policy motivations. European integration occurred while west Europe’s nation with the largest economic potential was occupied and divided during the Cold War.Hundreds of thousands of foreign soldiers were stationed along the internal German border. A multitude of nuclear weapons were deployed against each other. Compared with Japan today, West Germany was not seen as a serious potential threat while divided and occupied. West German foreign policy reflected the authorities’ awareness that their security situation was precarious. Germany’s economic reconstruction as well as long term economic prosperity also required economic trade with its neighbors, recently subject to Nazi imperialism. In sum, Germany was generally perceived as having sufficient motivation to support European Union integration with its obligation of German bankrolling of the project (NPR, 2010; Oudenaren, 2010: 21). Germany repeatedly and publicly accepted responsibility for crimes committed under the Nazi leadership that included paying tens of billions of German marks to Nazi victims. Germany and German economic actors continue to pay these reparations and continue to be subject to additional demands (Daley, 2013).

In South Korea and China, by contrast, Japan is viewed as unwilling to accept satisfactorily the responsibility for the war crimes under the Imperial government (Spitzer, 2012). The postwar Japanese nation’s security considerations are also significantly different from postwar Germany’s. Japan’s existence as an archipelago reinforces a view of dependency on good relations with at least the US and its allies to access vital international export markets. Yet Japan lacks the precariousness of West Germany’s postwar situation to convince its neighbors that Japan has a vital interest in reciprocally ceding its state sovereignty in cooperation with its neighbors. Japan is comparatively hesitant to accept public responsibility as the guilty party for the Pacific war and the crimes committed during it. This hesitancy, in comparison with Germany, is evidence supporting this doubt of the feasibility of Japan ever having the commitment to integrate cooperatively with its neighboring states. Consequently, it is another factor indicating a functional requirement for another actor external to the region to play the leading role in promoting East Asian integration.

The contrasts between China and Russia’s experience with liberal multilateral institutions are evident further in China’s stated interest in possibly joining the Trans Pacific Partnership (Bloomberg, 2013). Chinese commentators raised this possibility again after Japan stated its intent to join these negotiations, which it did in July 2013. This rhetoric is significant in the context of the worsening relations between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The possibility of Russia joining the EU is today absent from establishment discourse. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement began as an initiative of three small states, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, launched in 2003 (Fergusson et al. 2013: 23). The US embraced and endorsed it at the November 2009 summit meeting of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation in Singapore (Brown, 2010). One media report noted skepticism regarding the political feasibility of incorporating Vietnam into the TPP due to human rights issues regarding its labor force (Beattie, 2010). Since this report, the TPP moved forward rapidly to include Vietnam (Viet
Nam News, 2010). Peru and Australia also initiated negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement in November 2008 at the same time as Vietnam. All three did so two months after the US initially expressed interest in joining the negotiations (James, 2010). In July 2013, Japan formerly joined the TPP framework of negotiations (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). As a consequence of Japan’s accession to the negotiations, South Korea reiterated its interest in joining the TPP as well (Seok, 2013). This possibility has emerged despite potential complications for its trade liberalization agreement negotiations with China (Kyodo News International, 2013). The 12 countries currently participating in the TPP negotiations are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam (Kyodo News Service, 2013).

China as Strategic Competitor (Bush II) Versus China As Strategic Partner (Obama)

The absence of a formal multilateral security architecture underpinning the TPP akin to NATO for the EU is not an obstacle to Asian integration. In fact, it removes an obstacle to integration since such a construction would risk instigating a more suspicious, assertive and belligerent China in a spiral conflict. China’s influence is not likely to be as weak as Soviet influence. China long ago stopped being portrayed as a revisionist state like the USSR was envisioned from the start of the Cold War until its conclusion, at least among the US establishment. Nationalist movements among Asians more readily can find social creativity opportunities without a regional multilateral security alliance rather than with it. This potential exists because of the integration of the very large Chinese nation state into the global capitalist political economy alongside the extended US military presence in Asia. US establishment policy circles portray South Korea’s accession to the TPP negotiations as in fact likely to accelerate economic trade liberalization between China and South Korea (Solis 2013b, 16-17). Soviet power capabilities did not include the economic components necessary to integrate peacefully its developed neighbors. National self-determination has to be the keystone for regional integration, including national economic development. A formal, US-led multilateral regional security architecture in Asia would be more prone to generate perceptions that the TPP is a tool for coordinating the civilian power side of US allies in Asia. The EU is so arguably seen in Europe. As such, Russia views the EU as a derivative actor that is a product of the Cold War and is a handmaiden of NATO (Cottam and Cottam, 2001: 248). Unlike the EU, the TPP is not a multilateral actor. The regional response to the rising challenge from China will not as strongly emphasize a coordinated regional military foundation as emerged during the height of the Cold War in Europe. In other words, an Asian integration is unlikely to look like a European Union, even though the Asians may look to the EU as an example or model.

As a policy recommendation, intense US involvement should be viewed as desirable. In one scenario it may conceivably help empower domestically the Chinese central government to exercise control over the vast expanse of Chinese bureaucratic agencies (Buckley, 2013; Perlez, 2013b; “China’s New Agenda” 2013). They fight turf wars internally and competitively expand their de facto respective policy jurisdiction internationally including in the East and South China Seas (International Crisis Group, 2012). In this regard, the presence of significant US forces in Asia can help mobilize central Chinese political oversight to generate greater coherence in Chinese foreign policy. By inference, an increased military presence of the US in the South China Sea does not per se mean a worsening of US-Chinese relations (Brummitt, 2012). Comparatively, Russia acquiesced to and eventually accepted Euro-Atlantic intervention in the Balkans for regulation of Balkan conflicts (Milenkovic, 2013). Effective US strategic involvement in East Asian territorial disputes can reinforce the collective awareness of global interdependency. It can include security interdependency along with economic interdependency. This consequent growing bargaining leverage that these actors have over each other is a more sophisticated approach to understanding the US role in East Asia. It stands in contrast to the reference to the need to “counterbalance” China, not to mention contain it (Manning, 2013).
To help maintain peaceful relations through strategic engagement with China, the US would wisely ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). China has already ratified this treaty-based regime for regulating and resolving sea border disputes. The US administration signed the treaty but never submitted it to US Senate ratification, partly because it would not receive such ratification (Patrick, 2012). Nevertheless, the glaring implicit declaration that the US authorities do not have a consensus commitment to UNCLOS may encourage suspicions in Beijing. Specifically, it raises questions regarding US ulterior motivations and strategic goals in Asia. Meanwhile, the US reiterates that Beijing resolve its sea boundary disputes with its neighbors according to international norms that UNCLOS embodies (Perlez, 2013a).

CONCLUSION

The high degree of Chinese integration into the American-dominated global capitalist trading system has given China exceptional bargaining leverage towards the US. The Euro-Atlantic regional community was critically based around a perceived threat from Moscow lasting 45 years that was accepted at least in Washington, the dominant regional actor. These security concerns built up large vested bureaucratic, military and economic interests both in the Euro-Atlantic region and in the former Soviet Union. They are a product of the competing Cold War grand strategies of Washington and Moscow. Their influence in their respective polities continues. Concern about the lingering resentment in Moscow over its loss of empire generates a shared perception of threat in Europe to national self-determination. It promotes European national social creativity and social mobility as the Bulgarian case illustrates.

China began to move towards a de facto alliance with the US at a later midway point in the Cold War. Unlike NATO, the hub-and-spoke security system that the US created with its clients and allies in Asia avoided the creation of an anti-Chinese club of states to stoke Chinese fears of encirclement (Cha, 2009). It avoided the US allies’ horizontal integration around this raison d’etre. The consequences today include greater potential for integration of China into an evolving Pacific regional security and economic system in partnership with the US. The capacity to avoid promoting Asian national social creativity and social mobility on the foundation of intense Chinese-US rivalry is therefore greater than during the postwar era in regard to the USSR/Russia.

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