

# AMERICAN REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION, SEGREGATION, INTEGRATION AND ASSIMILATION: THE SOCIAL IDENTITY DYNAMICS OF UTILITARIAN COOPTATION

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## ABSTRACT

*The study highlights how authoritarian populist leaders manipulate the anti-Semitic and other stereotypes in scapegoating to overcome intra-core group polarization and mobilize political support. Alignment by two heretofore adversaries against a common third target as a perceived source of shared threat can generate a positive “ally” stereotype in shared mutual perception among the other former adversaries. Part of the anti-Semitic stereotype is the conspiratorial component, i.e., the advanced minority has higher socio-economic status because of ingroup hidden manipulation of significant components of the polity. Despised lower status ethnic ingroups, stereotyped as backward and childlike by the core, are prone to be perceived as being instruments for manipulation by the envied higher status outgroup. This analysis thus shows how the Holocaust was an essential element of the wartime German regime. It mobilized societal resources around scapegoating which was part of the normative active and coercive and utilitarian control mechanisms characterizing Nazi political control. Authoritarian populist regime enthusiasts can join the coercive apparatus to gain esteem and material benefits. Normative active control utilizing racist xenophobia was a means by which to generate support internally. Inferences from Great Power mid-twentieth century authoritarian populism are applied to the analysis of the US Trump phenomenon.*

**JEL:** H12, H56, H63, I38, K38, N11, N51, O15, O51, P11, P16

**KEYWORDS:** Achievement, Ascription, Nationalism, Political Regime, Social Identity, Social Competition, Social Creativity, Social Mobility

*“History Doesn’t Repeat Itself, but It Often Rhymes” – Mark Twain*

## INTRODUCTION

**A**s with any nation state, the American nation state may be metaphorically compared to a geologic manifestation, e.g., an island, which has its own core process dynamics. The outcomes of these core processes interact with the external environment, generating a surface layer outcome upon them. These dynamic interactive processes continue, punctuated by moments of upheaval amidst relative stability. They add layer upon layer, which the observer can examine by delving deep beneath the surface by taking a core sample to its foundation. By applying ontological frameworks to explain the existence and development of what is identified as a particular island, so may the twenty-first century American nation state be analogously explained in terms of its functioning and development. American state institutions have evolved from its colonial settler foundation. European early-modern colonial settler transatlantic commodity trade and exploitation of resources remains the foundation upon which the American nation state then evolved. This historical basis is critical for explaining what exists and functions as evident in behavior today after five centuries of societal evolution on this footing. This analytical approach typifies the methodological perspective of process tracing (Ricks and Liu, 2018, Collier, 2011, Kittel and Kuehn,

2013, Hall, 2013). In a deductive process tracing approach, the analyst applies a theoretical framework to explain the causal mechanism producing a particular case (Runhardt, 2021). “Evidence that testifies that the sequence so identified is a causal mechanism needs to come from elsewhere, and in particular, from fully-fledged social theories” (Ruzzene, 2014, 365).

This study applies the political psychological theorization of nationalism in Cottam and Cottam (2001) to proffer causal sequence relationships in its process tracing. It outlines the collective value and attitudinal trend dynamics in the development of the American polity that produced the Trump phenomenon, i.e., the ascendance of white populist reactionary nationalism. The Trump administration displayed behavioral tendencies suggesting a collective emphasis upon mobilizatory populist conservative reactionary public political participation. Concurrent with it was a noted predisposition to demonize “out groups” [*sic*] as sources of threat undermining traditional American values that allegedly made America “great” in the past (Fording and Schram, 2017, 670). These minorities had made inroads in reducing their political, social and economic marginalization significantly through the social justice movements that peaked in the postwar era (King, 2017). Their gains emerged concomitantly with the increasing globalization of the American political economy contributing to minority population demographic proportion growth. Globalizing trade, investment and finance flows reduced relative monetary income receipts for less skilled and less formally educated sectors of white society. These conditions primed their receptivity to scapegoat portrayals of the growing minority Other (Narayan, 2017).

The Nazi German control system is a European case approximating the Weberian ideal-typical model of an authoritarian populist political regime. Cottam and Cottam (2001) define fascism as a political regime type, not as an ideology. They identify the defining characteristics of the phenomenon of fascism. Its essence is the agency of state terror and a demagogic manipulation of symbols as the means by which an aspiring elite establish and maintain totalitarian control over a society. Fascism offered, 1) an appeal to traditional values, 2) glorification of the group as a nation, 3) opportunity for individual success with its basis in merit rather than in social status (Hamilton, 1971, xxi, cited in Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 135). This conceptualization of fascism, rather than as a doctrine, focuses on collective behavior patterns. Characterizing a fascist regime is an aspiring elite seeking to establish totalitarian control which agencies of state terror exercise together with a demagogic manipulation of symbols.

Cottam and Cottam (2001) argue that in 1939, among Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan, Imperial Japan most closely approximated this Weberian ideal-type definition. Even here, Japan diverged insofar as the aspiring elite in Japan was the Japanese military, and it was a core element in the ruling elite. It was an institution which had solidly established itself, having deep cultural roots, rather than being a vanguard of a counter-elite. Elite alteration away from the traditional aristocratic ruling class was underway, to be sure, but nothing comparable occurred to the elite replacement which occurred in Germany and Italy. Still, the level of control which this military elite exercised was totalitarian, and the primary means of elite control was state terror along with a demagogic manipulation of romantic symbols. But even here a difference was evident; strikingly less obtrusive was the Japanese internal propaganda effort in comparison to Germany and Italy.

Evaluating the Trump phenomenon according to the criterion of an aspiring elite leading it implies of course challenging the establishment elite. Trump’s core enthusiasts’ focus on so-called culture war issues reflected hostility to this establishment elite, as did their rejection of anthropogenic climate change as a scientific fact. “Framing the discussion in terms of reliable facts, however, can miss how movements that promote distrust in science often put emphasis on *cognitive authority*. After all, a defense of established expertise is also a conservative act, shoring up the power of existing institutions and recognized authorities” [*sic*] (Edis, 2020, 6). White self-described evangelical voters were at the core of Trump’s support. “The blend of cultural references, and the people who brought them [to the January 6, 2021 Washington, DC insurrection], made clear a phenomenon that has been brewing for years now: that the most extreme corners

of support for Mr. Trump have become inextricable from some parts of white evangelical power in America. Rather than completely separate strands of support, these groups have become increasingly blended together” (Dias and Graham, 2021, para. 5).

Elite elements in this proto-fascist movement occupied senior positions in the G.W. Bush administration. As in the Japanese case, the white Christian nationalist elite has long been part of the postwar American establishment (Hummel, 2016). This aspiring elite harnessed American white evangelical antipathy towards Barak Obama and Hillary Clinton to propel the Trump campaign. “While evangelical Republicans' levels of religiosity or faith are relatively uncorrelated with evaluations of Trump in 2016 and Romney in 2012, there is a strong negative correlation with Clinton and Obama evaluations” (Margolis, 2020, 91). Their leaders in turn disregarded Trump’s historical lack of evident religiosity to utilize him to gain preeminence over the governing institutions of the American state. “Borrowing Max Weber’s framework, white Evangelicals have turned away from the charismatic authority of the Church in favor of the rational-legal authority of the state” (Martí, 2019, 5). They emphasized influence on judicial appointments. They sought and gained this control to “fight against forces they view as tainting the purity of American identity, forces that include immigration, nontraditional gender roles, and same-sex marriage” (Ibid., 4-5).

Proto-fascist tendencies towards exploitation of terror as a governmental control mechanism displayed themselves almost immediately. The Trump administration ramped up family separations as well as deportations of undocumented residents. Of the 13.7% of the foreign-born US population in 2018, almost one-quarter were “unauthorized” (“Facts on US Immigrants,” 2018). They are mostly Hispanic, the largest ethno-racial minority in the US at 18% of the population. This nascent terror was by its nature a family affair; a majority of unauthorized US residents share households with authorized family member residents (Passel and Cohn, 2018). Their symbolic scapegoating was evident in the “visual cruelty” of Trump’s expansion of the border wall (Schuessler, 2021, para. 15). Women also became targets of incipient terror. Legal efforts intensified to grant American civil rights protection status to the embryo at the point conception under the “fetal personhood” campaign (Gersen, 2019). Successful efforts would effectively move towards not only abortion, but any impregnated female behavior deemed as unacceptably reckless for the wellbeing of the fetus becoming a punishable crime (“How a Stillbirth Becomes a Crime,” 2018). Nearly one-quarter of American women have undergone at least one abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017).

Hitlerian Germany allocated significant resources to the Holocaust when those resources could have been devoted to the military and military support efforts in its life and death struggle to avoid conquest. The question emerges as to why. The answer is that the Holocaust was the manifestation of the essence of the regime. Specifically, it mobilized societal resources around scapegoating as part of the normative active and coercive and utilitarian control mechanisms characterizing the Nazi regime (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978). Coercion was obvious; it was part of the terror generation mechanism. On this primary foundation, it employed utilitarian control in that Nazi regime enthusiasts could join the coercive apparatus to gain esteem and material benefits amidst tremendous societal change. These benefits became limited under wartime material sacrifices. Normative active symbolic appeals of romanticized self-versus-other including racist xenophobia was a means by which to generate support among Germans. It also appealed among some Europeans in occupied German-occupied Europe. It generated opportunities for individual social mobility and social creativity, i.e., intergroup social integration. Heretofore hostile groups could more readily psycho-socially integrate by allying against the mythologized, conspiratorial scapegoat, the Jewish-Capitalist-Bolshevik-Masonic global conspiracy.

Nationalism associates with stereotyping and affect. Mobilizing around a charismatic leader to enforce a secular mythology, i.e., a “Big Lie,” is part of this intense ingroup mobilization vis-à-vis outgroups (Adams, 2019, 238). German Nazi propagandist Josef Goebbels exploited this tendency, with the mythology of the global conspiracy among international Jewry being a core component (King, 2018). Hence, the Holocaust, despite the diversion of resources it required that could have been used for warfighting, was critical for the

German Nazi wartime regime. These social identity integrative dynamics occurred within the larger context of Nazi German social competition with its battlefield enemies. The latter, e.g., the American and Soviet regimes, displayed essentially different types of political regimes/control systems (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978). The Trumpian Big Lie was the stolen election involving a cosmological conspiratorial mythology of globalists, universal human rights advocates and communities of color and liberal Jews in league with corrupt white politicians. The QAnon phenomenon is another manifestation of demonizing, right-wing authoritarian populist “apocalyptic crisis discourses” (Rensmann, 2017, 125).

Cottam and Cottam (2001) note that the basis for strong negative attitudes towards nationalism derives from this close association of fascism, i.e., authoritarian populism, and nationalism. If nationalist symbols were not available, then the ability of an elite seeking to maintain totalitarian control in part through manipulation of nationalist, stereotypical symbols would in fact be unlikely. In addition, an insistence on the exercise of greater influence in the world arena and an aggressive advancement of national grandeur interests are most likely to occur in association with fascism. Yet, an association of nationalism with liberal humanitarianism is a far more frequent occurrence, and the outcome of the action is far more acceptable.

The next section presents a selected literature review explicating the abstract conceptualization of nationalism in relation to minorities within a national polity and regarding the political control regime. It highlights the variable vulnerability of minorities to scapegoating as a mechanism for an authoritarian populist elite to maintain its control in a nation state. The following section then specifies the application to the United States of America case that gave rise to the Trump phenomenon. The “Data and Methodology” section analyzes a theory-informed selection of Trump administration policies. It critically explains them within the more general theoretical context of authoritarian populism. It highlights the American case-specific dynamics through a qualitative, process tracing methodological approach. The “Results and Discussion” section highlights the behavioral patterns of the Trump administration that the Covid-19 global pandemic triggered. It highlights the tendencies towards systemic marginalization of transnational scientific evidence. It illustrates the collective cognitive response of authoritarian populists to the intensifying salience of ineluctable global interdependency which the Covid-19 global pandemic has magnified. The following section outlines the requirements for political strategy to respond to promote human rights protection of the marginalized without provoking authoritarian populist backlash. The conclusion highlights the importance of this approach to seek to avoid a conflict spiral between the US and China.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Minorities and Nationalism

Europe was the region furthest advanced in the globally inexorable process of increasing popular political awareness to encompass broader comprehension of extended communities of shared fate (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). It was a concomitant of the evident acceleration of societal change mobilizing its members to seek societal status enhancement. This dignity status would favor allocation through achievement while questioning the traditional status quo that ascribed individual societal status at birth. The rise of ambition-driven modernity among the mass public both reflected and accelerated the emergence of the modern economy. It contributed to Europe’s temporary power advantage over the rest of the world, allowing Europe to politically colonize and partition much of the planet. European contact accelerated these same ineluctable value trends among the indigenous colonized population. It hastened the rise of nationalist self-determination social movements in what are today labelled post-colonial “developing” countries (Fukurai, 2019, 210). European nation state power advantages dissipated as the twentieth century dissolution of European empires illustrated, often accompanied by violence exacerbated by external intervention, e.g., Southeast Asia. The US defeat in the Vietnam War illustrated the power of nationalism in the form of pan-Vietnamese unification and national self-determination.


The legacy of European imperialism includes often arbitrary imperial possession borders partitioning Africa, Asia and Latin America into what became legally sovereign, post-colonial states (DeDominicis, 2016). The rise of popular political awareness concomitantly included broader community-of-fate ingroup individual self-identification. These “imagined communities” corresponded with perceived ethnic, racial and sectarian shared fundamental ingroup similarities (Anderson, 1983). These ethnic, racial and sectarian identities were often typically more intense and salient to individual citizens. They often lacked boundary congruence with the territorial community encompassed by the post-colonial, internationally recognized state borders.

The perceived benefits conferring from command of the post-colonial state apparatus often set the stage for social competition within these multi-ethnic states among these ethnic groups. Refugees fleeing violent conflicts perceived as zero-sum social competition for control of the post-colonial state constitute much of the global diaspora populations. External actors exacerbated these conflicts by responding positively to local solicitations for political aid to defeat the local adversary. Inter-state conflict continues in the nuclear setting of near total popular political awareness. Imperial intervention typically takes the consequent form of competitive state actors allying respectively with one or more discontented local groups in a third state. They respectively support a local client against the local allies of the other state competitor (Cottam, 1967, Cottam and Cottam, 2001, DeDominicis, 2019). Competition for influence over the post-colonial state is thus indirect to avoid intentionally escalating to direct military conflict between the state power competitors, which is potentially suicidal in the nuclear era.

Differential rates of political mobilization among different cultural groups contribute to the generation of self-versus-other ingroup stereotype identities subject to comparative status evaluation. A negative self-evaluation of ingroup relative status vis-à-vis a cohabiting ethnic outgroup results in psycho-social identity management strategies (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). They are categorized here as social mobility, i.e., if desirable and boundaries are permeable, individually assimilate into the perceived superior outgroup. Another is social creativity, i.e., change the comparative evaluation criteria to produce a compensatory, positive self-evaluation. The third is social competition, which is engage in zero-sum collective action against the outgroup, e.g., compete for control of the state, or secede and create a separate, sovereign state that is legally equal in status. Of course, tremendous violence frequently accompanies the latter with concurrent self-reinforcing intensification of stereotyping and affect, leading even to genocidal attacks.

In Figure 1, the state has a core national culture, one more relatively prosperous ethnic minority and one more relatively poorer. “A” represents a minority community: high-achieving, as perceived, in comparison with the core community, “B;” “C” represents a minority community: under-achieving, as perceived, in comparison with the core community, “B;” “B” represents the core community, i.e., the comparison group, setting the standards for cultural-behavioral evaluation, hegemonic within the state. It typically constitutes a majority of the population, although not necessarily so, e.g., the Boer minority was the core group in apartheid-era South Africa. The differential community rates of political awareness mobilization constitute the perceived ethnic cultural distance, “d,” as perceived among the three groups. The greater the perceived cultural distance, the greater the obstacles to assimilation into the core group, “B.” “d” varies because of communities’ respective differential rates of popular political awareness, saliency and intensity of autonomous participation within economic, social and political change processes. In Europe, due to historical political and sociological conditions, Jewish minorities have been disproportionately engaged in financial and trade activities. They tend to occupy the “A” position, as do Armenians in the Middle East, Chinese in Southeast Asia, South Asians in East Africa, and the case list continues. Historically marginalized groups are generally closer to the “C” category, including legacy diasporas of colonialization and enslavement, e.g., African American, Romani and Indigenous groups.

Figure 1: Perceived Cultural Distance and Stereotyping Between Ethnic Groups in a So-Called Developing Country (Ideal-Typical Model)



This figure illustrates a theoretical framework for understanding nationalist movements among ethnic minorities. It utilizes the concept of core ethnic group in a state elaborated by Gordon (1964). In the USA, the core ethnic group is White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP), into which northern Europeans most readily assimilated. The distance “d” of other ethnic groups from the core group will determine the ease with which it assimilates into the core. If racial differences are seen as distinct, then integration will be very slow. The perceived level of achievement of a group is a reflection of its development rate. Those minorities at position “C” will tend to be stereotyped as lazy and shiftless by the core, “B.” Position “A” is defined by the core as pushy and aggressive. Integration and assimilation patterns depend on where the minority is on this continuum.

According to Cottam and Cottam (2001), the minority community at position “C” will tend to be stereotyped with contempt as lazy and shiftless, i.e., childlike, by the core, “B,” as well as by “A.” “C” will tend to be self-servingly stereotyped by “B” as weak in self-discipline and in the capacity to delay gratification. In sum, “B” will tend to blame the victim of oppression for the pathological behavioral manifestations of oppression (Staub, 2016, 69). Position “A” will tend to be stereotyped with envy as aggressive and well as conspiratorially and treasonously self-loyal and parasitical by “B” and “C,” i.e., the anti-Semitic stereotype (Bilewicz and Krzeminski, 2010). “A” will tend to stereotype “B” as culturally primitive, cruel, powerful and dangerous, i.e., the barbarian stereotype. The assimilation patterns that appear regarding minorities depends on where the minority is on this continuum (Gordon, 1964, Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The American white Anglo-Saxon protestant (WASP) core tends to stereotype African American and Indigenous communities as backward. Kapralski (2016, 110) describes collective behavior patterns akin to those evident in the 1921 Tulsa, Oklahoma white mob attack on the so-called Black Wall Street business district. Europeans tend towards the same perceptual simplification of the Romani people:

*“In the evening of June 25, [1991, in the town of Mlawa, Poland] the crowd gathered in a local bar and then went on to demolish houses inhabited by Roma. It should be noted that the first target of the attack was not the house of the young man [already in custody] who caused [the car] accident [killing 1 and injuring another], nor the wooden cabins in the vicinity of the bar, inhabited by the poorest Roma. The*

*crowd demolished the houses of well-to-do Roma and, on the second day of the riot, also the flats of less prosperous Roma (but the cabins of the poorest were left undamaged)*” (Kapralski 2016, 110).

Groups stereotyped as backward require external imposition of regulation because of their tendency towards “lawlessness and social deviance” (Toninato, 2018, 150). Their autonomous ingroup development and participation threatens the status quo dominated by “B,” which may then move to punish “C.”

Periods of accelerating social change contribute to perceived threat to ingroup political control which correlates with “conspiracy theorizing” as a manifestation of anti-Semitism psycho-social behavior (Kofta, Soral and Bilewicz, 2020, 901). Elite leadership among “A” and “C” communities will tend to bifurcate between those elites willing to collaborate and assimilate with “B,” versus those who will tend functionally to demand accommodation by “B.” Collaborative elites will tend to be more conservative, in accordance with their willingness to accommodate and assimilate. Rejectionist elites will tend to focus more on demanding societal change, including willingness to pay the significant costs of secession if perceived as necessary and achievable. In the case of Malaysia, the perceived local challenge from the advanced, business-oriented Chinese minority led to the expulsion of Singapore from the Malaysia confederation due to Singapore’s predominantly Chinese population. The Chinese minorities in these states in turn cooperate with the security services that tend to dominate them, receiving security in return for providing economic resources to these authorities (Chong, 2015). The danger from stereotyping to which the Chinese minorities are vulnerable was illustrated again in 1998 with the disintegration of the Suharto regime and the pogrom-like attacks against the Chinese (Bertrand, 2008).

In cases with the most polarizing political dynamics, militant rejectionist elites may lead separatist, i.e., national liberation, movements. A prerequisite is the prevailing view this highly costly option as being politically achievable (Kebede, 2001). Kurdish minority separatism among the post-colonial states partitioning upper Mesopotamia is a rejection of subordination and forced assimilation. It results from perceived political opportunities with the disintegration of Iraq and Syria (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Collective core cultural groups in post-colonial states tend to stereotype the Kurds as backward. Armenians were subjected to genocidal attacks during the First World War. Their structural embedding as an advanced minority led to suspicion of treasonous collaboration with Russia as Ottoman Turkey’s enemy. The genocidal violence they suffered foreshadowed comparable behavior patterns a generation later against the European Jews. It is noteworthy that Kurdish tribes constituted a disproportionate share of the coercive apparatus that perpetrated the Armenian genocide. As a backward group, their loyalty to traditional leaders cooperating with the central government made them more reliable as a coercive instrument in the multi-national Ottoman empire, the “hamidiye” (Souleimanov, 2012, 79).

The model diagrammed in Figure 1 considers the contestation between traditional and progressive, pro-change liberal elites. The latter, e.g., Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh (1951-53), are typically frustrated by the former in the early stages of mass political mobilization. This obstruction intensifies intra-progressive elite polarization between liberal and authoritarian radicals. Pro-change authoritarian radicalization, e.g., Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s ascension, is a response to these traditional, aristocratic elites, e.g., the Shah of Iran, tending to solicit external aid (Cottam, 1988). Their parochial control and traditional, ascriptive high status are threatened by intensifying national self-determination social justice movement demands. They seek thereby to prevail in their domestic struggle, while their contestants approach the great power opponent of the traditional elite’s great power patron. The propensity to respond positively to these solicitations is significantly dependent on the intensity of conflict between the great powers. It leads to an escalating dynamic of indirect external competitive interference in the post-colonial state (DeDominicis, 2019). The US allied with the traditional rulers of the Persian Gulf oil kingdoms. They were concerned with the European twentieth century partition and colonization of the Arab world insofar as it destabilized their predominance.

The US alliance with these conservative rulers was significantly a legacy of the Cold War while the USSR allied with the so-called rejectionist Arabs. The latter tended to be authoritarian militant representatives of secular pan-Arab nationalism. The latter rejected the establishment of the state of Israel. They supplanted the liberal progressive movement leaders who fell to external competitive subversion. Militant secular nationalist leadership failures, e.g., the humiliating outcome of the June 1967 Six Day War, strengthened sectarian social movement leaders. These populist social movements evolved into various branches including manifestations such as the Islamic State. This dynamic, however, requires that the mass public share a sense of self-potential power capability sufficient to believe in and aspire to the goal of pan-unification, despite the great costs entailed in the effort. Pan-African and the Indigenous movements are not collectively aspiring to unify a partitioned imagined national community into a sovereign entity to recreate the glory of an imagined unified sovereign golden age medieval past. Their collective propensity towards militancy is much more limited; greater aspirations are unwanted or are perceived as hopeless (Cottam and Cottam, 2001).

Today, advanced minorities in the US, i.e., Jews and Asian-Americans, have been targeted by members of marginalized but mobilized groups in spontaneous attacks. These assaults are reminiscent of pogroms against Jews in late imperial Russia. Asian-American businesses were targeted in 1992 in the Los Angeles riots and again in 2015 in Baltimore (“Count of Damaged” 2015, NPR 2015). Most recently, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic that President Trump described in racist terms such as the Wuhan flu or the kung flu, individual Black and Brown assailants have attacked Asian-Americans. In response to an interview question as to how to respond this increasing violence, New York state assembly member Ron Kim stated,

*“Listen, I think we all want to know that when we call 911, that police will show up and protect us. But to hand over everything, in terms of addressing the systemic reasons for the violence and hatred, to the police is not the solution. That requires much more resources and accountability from elected officials. It’s easy to individualize the hatred, to point fingers at the young Black and Brown teenager who are attacking the Asian older adults, and call it a day. It’s much harder to go back and improve the social conditions that’s brewing the violence”* [sic] (Kim, 2021, para. 27).

Generally, churches of the Korean diaspora are important in Korean American community organization. However, the church leadership had discouraged using the local church community as an organizational vehicle to direct political resources for influencing US policy objectives. This tendency changed following the attacks on Korean-owned businesses in Los Angeles in 1992 during the Rodney King police brutality riots (Jang, 2014). Korean businesses were again targeted in Baltimore in 2015 following the death in police custody of Freddie Gray, an African American.

The barriers and resistance to long term assimilation by “A” and “C” into the core, “B,” will correlate with the collectively prevailing perceived degree of cultural distance, “d,” from “B.” This perceived cultural distance in turn correlates with the differential rate of political mobilization among these groups. Immigrant Christian Europeans have assimilated more quickly in the white American core culture in this contested process than Jews and African Americans. In this long-term dynamic, the core culture alters, so that the American core culture today is distinct from its early modern foundations (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Increasing intermarriage rates is one indicator of integration and assimilation (Qian and Lichter, 2007).

A legacy of these differential rates of popular political community awareness expansion in colonial contexts includes the formal and informal institutionalization of ingroup vs. outgroup stereotyping (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). In accordance with the principle of motivated reasoning, colonizing exploiters of indigenous human resources tended to self-servingly stereotype the exploited target group. It thereby justified the expropriation of their resources (Hanson and Yosifon, 2004). Africans enslaved for early capitalist commodity agricultural enterprises were stereotyped in effect as genetically inferior, or at least as benefiting from enslavement. The latter purportedly exposed them to so-called civilizing influences of the imperial



power. Dispossession of indigenous peoples' lands correspondingly occurs concomitantly with self-justificatory perceptions of the other as at best childlike, at worst as primitive savages. So-called progress required the expropriation of these resources by the core.

Policies and laws emerge around these collective intergroup behaviors, serving to institutionalize these stereotypes. Enforced behavior in accordance with these policies and laws functions to translate these perceptions into prevailing attitudes, which if viewed negatively, are labelled prejudices and biases. They may become systemic, i.e., collective behavioral intergroup interaction outcomes systemically reinforce this marginalization of the despised Other perceived as inherently inferior. It need not be articulated and consciously adopted by individual members of society but rather becomes a collectively habituated institutional system of minority-core collective interaction over generations. It tends systemically to produce self-reinforcing socio-economic intergroup interaction outcomes that confirm the institutionalized stereotype, e.g., African Americans are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system. "Labels such as "criminal," "aggressive," "anti-school," and "hardcore" hover over Black male students' heads like crop dusters, spraying exclusion, oppression, and iniquitous discipline practices the very moment many enter the doors of American schools" (Hawkins-Jones and Reeves, 2020, 40). Intersectionality refers to the reinforcement of systemic societal marginalization. It accumulates socio-economic and health disabilities targeting the more vulnerable, increasing their vulnerability and cyclical marginalization.

Those systemically marginalized will more likely be poorer, thereby more likely to live in polluted living conditions, thereby to be more unhealthy and less able to work, reinforcing their marginalization. Empowering the marginalized requires exploiting this self-awareness of structural marginalization to self-identify as a diaspora. Self-identification with a homeland is a defining characteristic of a diaspora. Diaspora legacies of colonializing, enslaving early capitalist commodity-training empires include communities tending not to have intensely felt self-identifications with a powerful homeland state. "One of the strongest characteristics of a diaspora, however, is its self-conscious status as an immigrant community with an external homeland, even if that homeland may have no political reality" (Cribb and Narangoa, 2004, 184-85). The pan-African diaspora of course does self-identify with Africa, but Africa is not a centralized, powerful nation state political actor such as China. Pan-Africanism in the US is also predominantly an elite phenomenon (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Unlike the Chinese or Jewish diasporas, the diasporas of "the wretched of the earth" are less vulnerable to core group scapegoating as an imperial fifth column threat (Fanon, 1961). They lack an influential nation state homeland to which to be suspiciously stereotyped as secretly loyal.

### Authoritarian Populism


This perception of tendency towards conspiratorial treasonous disloyalty can contribute to the occurrence of genocidal attacks in the midst of political turmoil. "[L]ike in Malaysia, indigenous Indonesians sometimes regard the ethnic Chinese as disloyal citizens. When President Suharto came to power after an abortive coup in 1965, he blamed ethnic Chinese in general, and the Communist Party in particular, for the turmoil. Countless ethnic Chinese died in the subsequent bloodbaths. Beijing reacted by repatriating thousands of ethnic Chinese. Jakarta, in turn, suspended diplomatic relations with Beijing" (Friedrichs, 2018, 182-83).

Another aspect of the control system of the authoritarian populist regime is to attempt to strengthen the core enthusiast constituency by manipulating traditional negative stereotypes of minority groups. The charismatic demagogue scapegoats them. Outgroups within the polarized polity perceived as comparatively high achieving are prone to be caricatured in terms familiar in Europe as the anti-Semitic stereotype. Comparatively high-achieving ethnic, sectarian and racial groups in relation will generate emotional responses of envy from the core cultural group, usually an ethnic majority, that dominates the polity. This group by virtue of its political dominance implicitly creates the self-serving archetypal image standards

foundations of norm behavior in the polity upon which the state exists. Comparatively high-achieving ethnic groups in terms of socio-economic status, e.g., Jews in Europe, will tend to be viewed with envy by intense self-identifiers with the core group. Envy is the emotion engendered upon perceiving members of an ethnic minority outgroup having comparatively higher socio-economic status which the core self-identifiers desire. Since the core implicitly sets the stereotype standards for proper vs. improper behavior, the advanced minority group’s status is self-servingly viewed as inappropriately and unfairly acquired.

Figure 2: Authoritarian Orientation and Leadership Charisma

Instead of a left-right scale, in the figure below, a strongly positive orientation towards authority explains why so many German Communists were attracted to Hitler to support the Nazi regime.



*This figure shows how personal authoritarian orientation tends to override overt ideological dogma in explaining the relative degrees of charismatic authority an authoritarian populist leader has within a polity. Adorno, Fenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford (1950) identified a personality syndrome which they termed authoritarianism. Authoritarians are extremely conventional in their attitudes and morality. They are particularly hostile toward minorities or those individuals with unorthodox lifestyles. They view the world in which they live in terms of hierarchy. They offer obedience to those of high status. They attempt to dominate those whom they perceive to be below them in the sociopolitical order. One can find authoritarianism among people who support extremist politics of either the right or left (Danziger, 2007). They include the 1/6/21 rioters.*

Danziger (2007) notes that Adolf Hitler appeared to accept the principle that authoritarianism can associate with ideologies of the left or right. Despite the fact that the Communists were the archenemies of the Nazis, he had instructed Nazi Party officials to accept immediately into membership anyone who had previously been a Communist. Hitler assumed that these Beefsteak Nazis, who were brown on the outside - brownshirts - and red on the inside, would redirect their vigorous political support from one ideological extreme to the other. The propensity to stereotype is correlated with authoritarian orientation. One recent experiment on intergroup stereotype content and individual behavior seems to have confirmed this finding. "... [L]ow-RWA [Right Wing Authoritarian] participants seem more permeable to new evidences coming from the

actual social interaction respect than high-RWA ones ...” [sic] (Ponsi, Panasiti, Aglioti and Marco, 2017, 15).

The Nazi authorities manipulated stereotypes as scapegoating to overcome intra-core group polarization and mobilize political support. Scapegoating by two heretofore adversaries against a common third target as a perceived source of shared internal threat can generate a positive “ally” stereotype (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). This positive stereotype individual-level analogue is the friend stereotype by which these polarized core elements now towards each other. Part of the anti-Semitic stereotype is the conspiratorial component. The advanced minority purportedly has higher socio-economic status because of ingroup hidden manipulation of significant components of the polity. Despised lower status ethnic ingroups, stereotyped as backward and childlike by the core, are prone to be perceived as being instruments for manipulation by the despised higher status outgroup. The supposed aim of this alleged manipulation is to compensate for the advanced minority group’s smaller numerical population by utilizing the larger minority backward group to suppress the core. “White supremacy today is also distinguished by the prevalence of the “great replacement theory” - the idea that there is a plot, masterminded by Jews, to replace whites with other races” (Lord, 2019, para. 12).

## THE AMERICAN POLITICAL REGIME

### Political Authoritarianism and Liberal Symbolism

Effective liberal neo-corporatist regimes provide institutionalized routes for integration of potentially conflictual societal constituencies (DeDominicis, 2021). The American civil rights and other New Left social movements functionally aim to promote opportunities for social mobility and social creativity amidst changing individual and societal values. Discontent leads to mobilization for collective action to change policies, perceptions and attitudes to provide social creativity opportunities with real, concrete benefits. Rebuffs may lead to social competition.

The core group countermobilizes for collective reactionary pressure as it appears to be less prosperous with less status in a globalizing, diversifying and pluralizing world. White male core group grievance movements react to not receiving or losing the ascriptive status dignity their core enthusiasts habitually assume is their due (Clark, 2020). Traditional values are under threat, including from abortion rights because it challenges the traditional white male patriarchal family model. Women who are invested in self-identity terms in a relationship with a man who occupies this position may be offended by other women who challenge this self-identity conception by their very activity. Traditional conservative clergy articulate these traditional notions and they lead these conservative populist reactive social movements. Amidst the Covid-19 pandemic, American religious conservatives protested against the extended state governor-ordered shelter-in-place orders. They suppress church service attendance as a non-essential social gathering function while abortion providers, liquor stores and cannabis dispensaries remained open (Liptak, 2020).

Notably Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy has been a persistent issue among the African and Hispanic American communities and also among Trump enthusiasts in the WASP Republican party core (Otterman and Wilson, 2021). The stereotyping of so-called backward minorities in a direction conforming with the colonial stereotype by the core and advanced groups is reciprocated by the former. In conditions of social stability, the backward minority will tend towards perception of the perceived threat from core and advanced in terms of the imperial stereotype (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Collective behavior patterns that conform with it include a tendency to avoid interaction with the perceived superior culture imperial threat to self-identity satisfaction. The pharmaceutical-medical-scientific complex assuming transnational global leadership in confronting the pandemic is arguably perceived as an imperial threat to ingroup national self-identity.

The American national political control system significantly relies functionally on a parochial community focus founded in early modern colonizing rural political economy utilizing enslaved labor. This legacy remains in the proliferation and continued prominence of county authorities in immediate community regulation--coercive and otherwise—of education, welfare and services provision. The American symbolic idealization of so-called “small government” represents the collective cognitive-affective accommodation to this legacy. “Of the seven states with 100 or more counties, five are former slave states. Texas has far and away the most with 254; Georgia 159 and Kentucky (a state with two-thirds Georgia's land area and much, much smaller than Texas in both size and population) 120” (Hutton, 2014, 4).

Traditional American authority parochiality resonates with the current decentralization mantra of neoliberal policy discourse. “Neoliberal economics and suburbanization have renewed the scope of county government in some places, often in ways that echo the nineteenth century” (Hutton, 2014, 1). This symbolic idealization of American romantic self-identity symbols derives from the self-justificatory function of motivated reasoning. “[T]he South is idealized for “authentic” American values, jeopardized elsewhere by economic and social change: close-knit families and communities, good manners, warm hospitality, hard work, honesty, firm religious beliefs, and an ethic of mutuality so strong that it could even soften the harsh edges of racism. Displacing these dynamics onto the exceptional South is to underscore their centrality to U.S. history” (Edwards, 2009, 535).

Early commodity-trade based global capitalism incentivized institutionalization of slavery, parochialism and consumption as the basis for gaining status among white settlers in colonial America. European-Americans raised their social status through increasing consumption income within the larger framework of an American ascriptive racial caste hierarchy that superseded European class hierarchy. American colonists engaged in motivated reasoning articulated rhetorically in Puritanism to justify enslaving other humans in order to maximize exploitation of resources for their material benefit. The evolution of America’s Puritan Calvinist religious ethical rhetorical forms reflected the core influence of the institution of slavery that continued to legitimate white supremacy (Zafirovski, 2020). The racial pagan other was everywhere, so the threat was everywhere, i.e., simultaneously universal and parochial, focusing social interaction awareness in the immediate vicinity. Religion evolved accordingly, as American Calvinism, unadulterated by aristocratic institutional influences, became both universalistic and parochial, like the universal Church in medieval Europe. It served to legitimate the parochiality-focused system of racial caste-based authority norms.

American WASP core regime institutionalization of normative habitual hierarchical obeisance associates with this ascriptive slavery legacy from motivated reasoning to justify segregation. That is, it functionally justifies white supremacy:

*“Race in 17<sup>th</sup> c. England once meant lineage (e.g., religion, tradition, language), but rearticulations across the Atlantic would soon identify the human body as the locus of racially differentiated “natures.” Race in 17<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> c. British North America came to mean morphology, which defined the newly invented white race “almost exclusively” through bodily structures and markers. The next major shift occurred in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> c. United States, where biological sciences conceived of racial populations in relation to developmental processes and capacities. Such notions informed 20<sup>th</sup> c. US policymakers, physicians, and educators who feared for the white genetic “hygiene” assailed by homosexual, black, and other “sexual predators”” [sic] (Lee 2017, 18).*

Its institutional and affective legacy today tendentially stereotypes the post-civil rights movement urban poor today as individually, de facto inherently responsible via their culture for their impoverishment. This stereotype-based attitudinal behavior response to social justice demands intensified amidst the crisis intensification of societal polarization due to the disruptions of the Covid-19 pandemic. The WASP militant core tends to view these marginalized groups, disproportionately struck seeking government relief

intervention, as a threat to core national values. In sum, these marginalized groups implicitly or explicitly advocate “socialism,” a supposed mortal threat to the American nation (Klarman, 2020, 148). Grote highlights the tendency of community political economies to find, stereotype, marginalize and scapegoat minority groups to legitimate the status quo benefitting the dominant. Slavery as an institution is the most blatant historical form of this systemic process. “[T]he wounds of mass scapegoating continue to be as pervasive as ever but unremarkable, as if by mass wish fulfillment mass poverty transmogrified yet again from its actuality as an effect of a man-made social equilibrium first clarified by [Adam] Smith into being a tacit and otherworldly given” (Grote, 2009, 193).

Neoliberalism purposefully blinds itself to this reality, reflecting the institutionalization of self-serving images of self and other at the heart of slavery-based early commodity international capitalism:

*“While it [the neoliberal Chicago school of economics] may well also represent the collective-conscious ideology and utopia of capitalist plutocracy, oligarchy and aristocracy and laissez-faire capitalism, [Mannheim’s theoretical conceptualization of the] sociology of knowledge primarily reveals Chicago and related economics as the collective-unconscious one, consistent with its emphasis on ‘collective unconscious’ societal factors at the root of ideologies” [...]*

*“Chicago economics tends to merge this plutocratic apologetics with that of theocracy consistent with the observed empirical tendency for plutocracy and above all oligarchy and aristocracy to fuse or ally with the latter, as witnessed in European medieval society as well as contemporary America, especially the South (the ‘Bible Belt’)” (Zafirovski, 2019, 515-16).*

The path dependent legacy of the American community foundation upon ascriptive racial hierarchy includes the elaborative evolution of authority institutions. They both reflect and reinforce de facto casteism through collective behavior. Driving this behavior are institutionalized collective affect-laden stereotypes that are situationally dependent as to their saliency, i.e., when an actor perceives a challenge to the attainment of desired goals. For example, a public-school teacher undergoing performance evaluation may implicitly rationalize the comparatively underachieving performance of their students of color as due to their inherent laziness (Reyna, 2008). Teacher-actor passive response behavior on the basis of this stereotypical causal attribution is more likely to reinforce the comparative performance capability deficit of the student. It thereby reinforces the structural institutionalization of the stereotype.

These affect-laden institutionalized stereotypes of self and other lead to collective attitudinal responses to ingroup challenges. These responses include the accompanying motivated reasoning rhetorical ethological self-serving justifications. Donald J. Trump reflected and exploited these institutionalized, collective perceptions and attitudes supporting implicit but systemic, institutionalized white supremacy. His modal enthusiasts may surely deny that they are racists. Changing American polity demographics, diversification policies and political outcomes stimulated the saliency of intense traditional implicit ascriptive status idealized ethical stereotypes. They prevail within the WASP core. Trump’s campaigns exploited these affect-laden anxieties, making ingroup loyalty affect display the dominant political behavior pattern in his public political appeals for partisan support (Martin, 2021). The media refers to these behavior patterns as “culture wars” (Edmondson, 2021, para. 9).

In sum, racism is a structural and systemic output pattern as it manifests in repetitive collective interaction outcomes. Others have noted the institutionalized pattern of collective outputs that reflect this path dependency to produce systemic inequality on the basis of subjectively defined, ascriptive race:

*“Dr. Kendi’s book [How to Be an Antiracist], a memoirish argument that Americans of all races must confront their roles in a racist system, has drawn attention, and controversy, for pulling the word “racist” away from its current usage as a hypercharged word reserved for the clearest cases. He thinks the word*

*should be attached to actions, not people, and used to describe supporting policies -- like standardized testing -- that produce a racially unequal outcome. The focus on outcomes helped put Dr. Kendi at the center of the long-running argument about the roots of inequality. But when he published his book, he said, he was bracing for criticism from the left. It had become an axiom in some circles that Black Americans can't be racist by definition. But the people committing racist acts in his book include President Barack Obama and Dr. Kendi himself" [sic] (Smith, 2021, para. 10).*

Section 2 of the 1965 US Civil Rights Act, enacted amidst significant social justice movement challenges to the American regime, “prohibited laws that have discriminatory effects on minority voters in order to ensure that legislators cannot disenfranchise those voters simply by avoiding making a record of their intent to do so” (Litman and Willis, 2021, para. 12).

In a January 2021 poll, 66% of self-identified Republicans stated that the November 2020 election was “not legitimate,” reflecting Trump’s repeated falsehood of massive election fraud (Cox, 2021). Subsequently, Republican-controlled state legislatures throughout the US accelerated moves to restrict and limit ease of ballot access, completion, delivery and counting (Leonhardt, 2021). The functional assumption of these restrictions is that they would impact white voters, particularly the elderly and rural poor. The greater impact would disproportionately affect the urban poor, i.e., communities of color. They claim a significant danger exists of voter fraud, which has been vanishingly rare in the American modern era. This patterns response seems to be a multigenerational collective attitudinal reflex reaction of conserve traditional institutions that associate with functional WASP cultural hegemony. In sum, traditional voting procedures reflect an ascriptive WASP collective behavior orientation towards voting. It de facto functionally insists on being blind to informal voting barriers arising from intersectional socio-economic marginalization of stereotyped, historically despised minorities. In other words, it denies the structural, systemic racism in the American national system of authority norms whose systemic output critics label as white supremacy.

This 2021 Republican collective trend foundation is that a zero-sum, social competition focused relationship functions between the WASP core and underachieving marginalized ethno-racial groups. For example, in the Arizona Democratic Secretary of State’s lawsuit against Republican majority-passed legal restrictions on ease of ballot access, completion and deposit, the lawyer for the defendant openly admitted,

*“Overturning a restrictive Arizona law, said Michael A. Carvin, the lawyer representing the Republican Party of Arizona, “puts us at a competitive disadvantage relative to Democrats. Politics is a zero-sum game, and every extra vote they get through unlawful interpretations of Section 2 hurts us,” referring to the part of the Voting Rights Act that is generally used to protect voting access for minority groups.”*

*“It’s the difference between winning an election 50-49 and losing,” he said.”” [emphasis added] (Epstein and Wines, 2021, para.3-4).*

In the same report, the lawyer for the plaintiff stated,

*“In her closing statement on Tuesday, Jessica Ring Amunson, the lawyer for Katie Hobbs, Arizona’s Democratic secretary of state, urged the court to seek a higher vision of democracy than the “zero-sum” game the Republicans described. The country functions best, she said, when all eligible Americans have the right and access to vote.”*

*““We should actually want to ratchet up participation so that every eligible citizen who wants to vote can do so. Candidates and parties should be trying to win over voters on the basis of their ideas, not trying to remove voters from the electorate by imposing unjustified and discriminatory burdens,” she said.”*

*“Speaking of the Republicans, Ms. Amunson concluded: “Unfortunately, petitioners have made clear that that is not their vision of democracy””* (Epstein and Wines, 2021, para. 30-32).

Republican efforts insist that they are the ones being colorblind, in accordance with American ideals, i.e., the marginalized are individually each responsible for their marginalization. This last inference articulates the implicit attitudinal motivated reasoning justifying the white supremacy institutionalized collective attitude prevailing among the WASP core culture within the American polity.

### The American Regime Security Apparatus

The authorities may also reactively aim functionally to stabilize the regime through mobilization of the core group coercive apparatus to increase reliance on coercion. These bureaucratic coercive apparatuses as well can provide utilitarian economic and participation opportunities (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978). The security services have traditionally been a route for social mobility for assimilating migrant communities who face prejudicial discrimination. Nineteenth-century, Catholic Irish immigrants, confronted prejudicial discrimination and stereotyping as backward and brutish, prone to criminality. To this day, a slang term for a police wagon is a Paddy wagon (Painter, 2008, 13). They exploited opportunities for social mobility by joining local police forces, focused disproportionately on marginalized groups, including the Irish. It was both “a reflection of a racial and class hierarchy and also a way of giving power to groups that feel like they don’t have access to the top of the American economy” (Muhammad, 2020, para. 14).

Police unions have again come under intense criticism for their resistance to increasing police personal liability for use of force in interaction with civilians. WASP reactionary populists tend to evoke the “blue lives matter” mantra against Black Lives Matter, while police forces have substantially increased their minority group member composition. Police forces and the state institutional coercive apparatus have become associated with American white supremacy. This association allows the public to grant legitimacy to the police union as an exception to WASP reactionary populist suspicion of organized labor. After the 8/9/14 police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, AFL-CIO head Richard Trumfka equated police unions with any other union, while AFL-CIO member turnout to protest the killing was “unsurprisingly meager” (Roediger, 2016, 229). “I doubt the possibility of a world without policing in the sense that societies inevitably define and enforce norms, which makes policing basic to cultural and structural relations” (Ward, 2018, 169).

This historical fact implies that an institution that has come to symbolize romantically the American nation is the local coercive apparatus, i.e., the local sheriff and police. Reporting on the appointment of the first Black county sheriff in the 131-year state history of Wyoming notes that “Sheriff Appelhans' approach is a stark departure for a Wyoming sheriff, a storied, sometimes archaic institution central to the lore of a disappearing American West” (Watkins, 2021, para.9). Enforcement of casteism parochiality requires a local enforcer. It may be a citizen’s militia, in its most militant form like the Ku Klux Klan, or in its more moderate form in the democratically elected local sheriff (Lepore, 2020). The decentralized national coercive police apparatus also plays a role: organizational parochialism in combination with nationalism. The Trump administration pit the George Floyd Black Lives Matter protests against the white working class. This behavior pattern was reminiscent of how US President Nixon pit the white working classes, both in uniform (e.g., the Ohio National Guard) and outside (working class whites) against protestors (Bryan-Wilson, 2007). The *New York Times* reported that the Trump administration resumed the policy begun during the Clinton administration to transfer surplus military equipment to local US police departments during the “war on drugs.” This transfer expanded during the “war on terror” after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

The dispersal of the US security apparatus both geographically and institutionally as a legacy of this parochial, slavery-based political economy continues in its ramifications. A US National Public Radio

report noted that since 2008, many American localities have increased fees and charges on those convicted of misdemeanors, e.g., traffic violations, aside from felonies. The politically and economically marginalized have been increasingly shouldered with growing fines and fees, including extraneous local government service charges. This trend is a response to failure to increase taxes to pay for public goods like community security and public health. These negative policy trends build upon historic marginalization to further reinforce institutionalization of marginalization in a positive feedback loop. This report further notes that local authorities in Ferguson, Missouri had issued so many arrest warrants for failure to pay these assigned fees so that the average household had 3.6 warrants. To counter these trends one economist advocates American state governments no longer allowing local policing and judicial authorities to keep all fees and charges gathered through these means (“Fine and Punishment,” 2021).

## DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The process tracing methodological approach in this analysis portrays the evolution of the American state from its settler colonial beginnings to explain current political cleavages and polarizations. The police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson on August 9, 2014 was a catalyst for mobilization publicizing the Black Lives Matter social justice movement. This economist’s policy recommendation would disincentivize reliance on functionally reinforcing the marginalization of the historically subjugated for exploitative value extraction (Ibid.). American Gramscian legitimation of the current system portrays the marginalized as poor because of their inferiority. As argued above, European settler colonial religiosity legitimated enslavement and expropriation as due to the subjugated lacking God’s grace.

The Obama administration prohibited the transfer of military weaponry to US police departments after a series of high-profile police killings of Black men. The Trump administration rescinded the restrictions in 2017 (Edmondson, 2020, para. 14). D’Amico (2017, 11) argues “much of classical criminology is in effect a retroactive composition of commentaries provided by classical political economists that happened to touch upon the subjects of crime and punishment.” Outsourcing to for-profit prisons in the penal system is a stark illustration of the property and whiteness being intrinsically related in American institutionalized collective attitudes. Its historical foundation lies in African Americans originally viewed as enslaved labor from which to profit. All components of the judicial system, including bail and the effort to require payment of all court fees, enforce a form of neo-serfdom. Slaves replaced serfs as Calvinism came to America without a state-sanctioned church legitimating class hierarchy ingroup identities. Rather American Calvinism focused on one, race, justifying the institution by its being employed against heathens. Slavery thereby Christianized them. The industrializing North moved to commodify labor by segmenting it temporally into a more fungible service, i.e., wages. Formal-legal institutionalized slavery faded in the North in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The modal member of the core, the so-called WASP group into which other Caucasian-European immigrants have assimilated, rallied around Trump amidst the Covid-19 pandemic. “[W]hite people [were] the only racial group in which a majority voted for Trump” in 2016 and 2020 (Cineas and North, 2020, para. 2). The casualties of the pandemic have been disproportionately African American and Hispanic-American. These groups are disproportionately more likely to live in the most densely populated urban areas. Their occupations and lower incomes are more likely to require them to continue to circulate socially in order to work, i.e., they tend to be much less able to shelter in place, work remotely, and practice social distancing. They also are more likely to have acquired pre-existing medical conditions and weakened immune systems for the same reasons as a legacy of Jim Crow, structural racism and undocumented status. These groups also constitute a disproportionate percentage of the incarcerated American population of over 2 million where social distancing is also not readily feasible. The Covid-19 pandemic can come in effect to be collectively perceived among the modal WASP core group member as an affliction targeting the urban poor.



Collectively, typically unspoken, heretofore latent, American stereotypical assumptions, with their roots in the early modern colonial political economy, equate poverty with racial inferiority (Gould, 1999). They may increase in salience and intensify while Trump-associated elites, as the so-called alt.right, occupied senior positions in the WASP core group-dominated American state. They manipulated symbolic so-called dog whistles while attacking Democratic party government officials at the federal, state and local level. The modal WASP voter appears to equate the Democratic party as the party of American non-whites. According to the Pew Foundation, Trump's margin of greater support among 2016 White voters was 21%: 58% for Trump, 37% for Clinton. Romney demonstrated 20% greater support among 2012 White voters over Obama (Tyson and Maniam, 2016).

The Trump administration stereotyped Muslims as a terrorist threat. Israel's conflicts with the overwhelmingly Muslim communities amidst which it was created intensifies the alliance of American white conservative populism with American Zionism supporters. Many Jewish-Americans are supporters of Zionism, as are many in the US evangelical white Christian community. The latter is the American sectarian self-identity group most cohesively supportive of the Trump election campaign (Rogers, 2021). Both the US and Israel are colonial settler-based states, i.e., racism is at the foundation in the identification of self vs. the racial Other who has been displaced and its resources expropriated.

As Cottam (1994) notes, the ally stereotype is relatively ephemeral, based on a convenient tactical alliance that can change if ingroup tactical aims change to achieve ultimate objectives. These objectives include Western community control over the Levant, i.e., the so-called Holy Land, and Greater Israel made achieving this identity ideal possible. Jewish-American supporters of Zionism have welcomed this evangelical support, but some observers view this support as potentially and dangerously volatile (Kirkpatrick, Dias and Halbfinger, 2018). Politically high-profile American evangelical pastors John Hagee and Mike Bickle described Adolf Hitler as sent by God to persecute the Jews to drive them to Israel after rejecting Jesus as the Messiah (Maddow, McNeal and Benen, 2016). Authoritarianism is a significant component of Trump's white nationalist populist political charisma.

Targets for advanced group stereotyping include East Asian-Americans particularly with the rise of China. Targets for backward group stereotyping as being manipulated by the advanced group include refugees. "In October 2018, a mass shooting occurred at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. Just before the attack, the shooter condemned a Jewish-run refugee charity, claiming that they bring in invaders that kill our people, which echoes a common Great Replacement narrative" (Ocbazghi, 2019, para. 31). The latter "narrative" is the thesis that a global conspiracy is "maliciously marginalizing and deliberately replacing white populations" (Ibid., para. 3). As the largest ethnic minority in the US, many Hispanic families have members who are undocumented. The fear of being targeted and deported therefore extends far beyond the undocumented individuals. The conspiratorial worldview would include these groups favoring free trade and loosened border controls. The building of the wall barrier along the US-Mexico border's significance lies not really in its effectiveness in reducing immigration. Rather, its significance lies in reinforcing collective American polity perceptual trends in perceiving intensifying threat from external, culturally distant states and their populations, reinforcing stereotyping.

*"And with the border wall, he [Jason Scott Smith, a professor at the University of New Mexico] argued, what matters isn't just what was built (452 miles of wall, he said, only 80 of which was new). "Trump's rhetorical commitments to infrastructure, while unfulfilled in terms of physical construction," Smith wrote in his paper, "in fact underwrote a sea change in the legal mechanisms and policing capacities of the federal government.""*

*"That included harsh deportation and detainment policies for unauthorized immigrants. And then there was the larger psychological and symbolic effect of the wall itself. "Maybe in terms of mileage it's not a*

*lot,” he said during the discussion. “But the visual cruelty of the wall is really striking.”*” [emphasis added] (Schuessler, 2021, para. 14-15).

The wall reinforces attitudinal trends of xenophobic, exclusionary behavior in response to these perceptions. The wall also reinforces national security defense values. With the nuclear setting and nationalism, national grandeur’s salience may trend towards exclusionary, xenophobic behavior. It demonstrates economic and social dominance over the internal representatives of the threatening other, e.g., Hispanic and Chinese Americans. Border wall construction continued during the Covid-19 pandemic (Smith and Holden, 2020).

The administration of Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador was notably quiescent in reacting to the Trump movement’s scapegoating of Mexican immigrants and undocumented residents. Trump officially launched his successful presidential campaign in his June 2015 announcement, declaring that they threaten Americans by being “rapists,” “criminals,” “drug dealers” (Lee, 2015). During Lopez Obrador’s July 2020 visit to Washington, he stated [...] “I’m here to express to the people of the United States that their president has behaved with us with kindness and respect. You [Trump] have treated us just as what we are: a country and a dignified people; a free, democratic, and sovereign people” (Leal, 2020, para. 8). The political psychology of nationalism implies that a more active, rhetorically hostile response would functionally have served to reinforce Trump’s mobilizatory appeal among his core support group. In such a scenario, a more antagonistic response would have facilitated Trump’s scapegoat targeting of Hispanic Americans as a fifth column threat loyal to a hostile neighbor.

An essential feature of authoritarian populist regimes is intense polity polarization which a belligerent Mexico City response would have expedited in American internal political trends. It would have assisted in Trump’s re-election campaign, which although it failed, nevertheless generated surprising increases in support among Hispanic-American and Black voters (Ulloa, 2021). Trump’s militant appeals to white supremacy included as its concomitant an appeal to internalized stereotypes of Mexican inferiority as a backward minority in the American context. [...] “[T]he relationship between Mexican Americans and Mexicans of Mexico has been weak and riddled with mutual stereotypes of inferiority (Shain, 1994-95; 1999-2000). Put in social-identity terms [...], identification with Mexico is at best ambivalent in that it offers little in terms of a positive self-image” [*sic*] (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 76-77). US President Trump’s polarizing stigmatization of Mexico and Mexicans caused more Mexican Americans to react to affirm their self-identification with the American nation state. They apparently asserted their self-association with assimilatory American nationalism by perceiving Trump favorably, even charismatically. “From Brownsville [Texas] to El Paso, a president who has routinely disparaged Mexicans strengthened his support among Mexican Americans [in the 2020 US presidential election]” (Hennessy-Fiske, 2020, para. 4).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Some may even perceive political opportunities in the midst of the pandemic crisis, i.e., reasserting WASP core group dominance of the state even utilizing coercion. This coercion may be in the form of disregard and passivity, i.e., doing less than what is feasible since the pandemic disproportionately targets the urban poor for serious illness. Limits exist to this tendency because inherent interdependency requires working class occupations to continue in which people of color are disproportionately employed. Many of these occupations are essential for a functioning, not to mention a prosperous, economy. Slowness and ineffectiveness in the disorganized American 2020 response in comparison with those of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China is a topic of political controversy. Some core group enthusiastic Trump defenders will highlight the greater American value upon personal freedom. It leads to a consequent reliance on local initiative to explain and dismiss the comparatively high American casualty figures. They will do so for the same reasons as they do regarding refusal to enact gun control laws to address the ongoing US

epidemic of gun violence disproportionately affecting people of color. In sum, it is the supposed “price of freedom” (Smyth, 2021, para. 28).

Freedom is the inverse of “socialism,” which has become a dog whistle for people of color taking control of government (Mulligan and Brunson, 2020, 332). They would use this control to increase taxes to pay for social welfare program increases as well as to challenge traditional behavioral norms, e.g., universal access to legal abortion. The attitudinal tendency to respond lethargically had its precedents in other catastrophes disproportionately striking populations perceived as backward and hence viewed with disdain. Examples include the failed 2005 US federal government response to Hurricane Katrina striking New Orleans, an urban area that is 65% African American. Irish Catholics during the Great Famine experienced a parallel London central government passivity that stimulated Irish nationalism (Kanter, 2016). This structural racist disdain and contempt may be most likely to appear in the incarceration system including the undocumented immigrant detention centers. The spread of Covid-19 among these populations may be dismissed as the price of committing crime and does not justify releasing massive numbers of the more than 2 million incarcerated and detained.

More intense cases in the Twentieth Century include the German scapegoating and then subsequent invasion and ghettoization of Jews in occupied territories amidst wartime crisis environments. “[T]he collective, sustained killing of an entire group by another is very much a social phenomenon” (Lower, 2011, 218). Escalating chaotic wartime functional collective, multidirectional scapegoating deepened their systemic segregation (Ica, 2013). Their targeting resulted in impoverishment, disease, famine and despair as objects of contempt and hatred. Their intensifying physical community marginalization concomitantly expedited the collective psychological accommodation to liquidating them in the dominant group consciousness (Gilfillan, 2018). The US is obviously not Nazi Germany, but Nazi German policies are the exponential intensification of trends in perceptions, attitudes and values having far-reaching policy making impact in the US. America is not exceptional.

The *New York Times* reported on the scientific and political authorities’ challenge of communicating the inherent uncertainty in Covid-19 pandemic information amidst its evolving concomitant crises. One issue raised was the public’s “trust” in the scientific information and its source if the uncertainty was explicitly recognized in this communication. The findings of the Cambridge University study covered in the report indicated that explicitly communicating uncertainty does not affect the degree of the public’s “trust” in the information (Roberts, 2020, para. 26). Whether or not the public believes the facts and figures issued by scientific authorities is another form of the question of whom do particular public constituencies trust. Through trust, a public constituency grants legitimacy to the authority to lead them in making binding decisions. In a time of crisis, stereotyping and affect associated with ingroup solidarity values become more salient. The modal WASP primary intensity self-identifier will tend, like nationalists generally, to orient towards becoming more tribal in both perception and behavior. They do so in responding to an intensely perceived challenge, i.e., threat or opportunity, to the ingroup (Oliver, 2020, para. 16). Concomitantly, their collective prevailing view perceptions will tend towards stereotypes of outgroups. Government policy achievement failures overseen by their leader is more likely to be dismissed as lies/fake news propagated by enemies or explained as part of conspiracies against the group and leader.

## A PATH FORWARD

Social justice reforms, e.g., affirmative action programs, functionally aim to break this self-reinforcing cycle of segregation and marginalization of traditionally, ascriptively marginalized minorities. International human rights treaties emerged amidst the growing awareness of ultimate interdependency within the international community in that structures of internal oppression increasingly impact external state actors. The Nuremberg trials underscored for the global audience that international peace and security requires worldwide recognition of legal limitations on state agent systemic abuse. These limitations include those

against systemic behavior marginalizing and abusing their respective internal state subjects (Cassese, 2005). Yet, avoiding nationalist backlashes against alleged external state internal interference in the internal affairs of a state is an imperative. The external pressure for internal social justice in the target state must appear to be unbiased. The justification for explicit or implicit imperialism has always included utilization of broadly appealing religious or ideological symbols, including today the defense of human rights. The global audience typically comprehends this behavior pattern, which Hans J. Morgenthau (1978) labelled nationalistic universalism. It still serves a purpose in terms of mobilizing allies and appealing for domestic support for external adventures.

Cottam and Cottam (2001) note that intervention in the name of human rights in the allegedly sacred internal affairs of a target state can generate a nationalist backlash within the target. Human rights as part of a proclaimed so-called responsibility to protect risks intensifying ethnic intergroup polarization. It can rise to potentially genocidal levels if it is perceived as propagandistic cloak for ultimate ulterior nationalistic motives of the intervener. The identified oppressed minority group risks even greater persecution because it is viewed as de facto fifth column traitorously serving the camouflaged, real imperialist aims of the external initiator state. An essential requirement is the creation of a prevailing perception among the target people and government that irresistible, unbiased global public opinion pressure in the area of human rights exists. Prevailing views must be that irresistible global public opinion demands are causing interceding governments to apply this pressure. The government applying the pressure must conclude that the political price of abandoning the human rights campaign is greater than they can pay. The target government and people must understand that the governments applying the human rights pressure lack the decisional latitude to abandon the human rights campaign.

“The central point is that success in the advocacy of human rights in international relations in the long run requires the existence of an international ideological pressure group capable of placing irresistible pressure on a number of states simultaneously” (Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 264). This analysis proposes the creation of a supranational identity community, with representatives occupying its superordinate institutional representational positions. It is part of the strategic formula prescription to create this international human lobby pressure group. Progress implementing this formula equates with creating a diverse human rights constituency. It would place pressure on transparent legislative, executive and judicial processes which demonstrate a variety of access points. “The issue of human rights must be separated from nationalistic values, and this can only be done if it is not associated with a particular country as advocate and if support for particular human rights stances is internal, external and diffuse enough so that no single actor is targeted, all are expected to live up to certain expectations, and no single actor can be identified as interfering in another’s internal, and untouchable, affairs” (Ibid.).

The initiator state’s demand to end systematic human rights abuses within the target state should be perceived by the target state public appropriately. It should be seen as stemming from irresistible, genuinely transnational public opinion pressure on the initiator state. The United Nations legal and institutional system is a rudimentary global institutional architecture for aggregation and articulation of human rights demands. Around this infrastructure, transnational civil society may coalesce and organize. The present nuclear setting includes near total popular political awareness. Generating this irresistible political pressure increasingly encompasses the necessity to incentivize effectively the cooperation of for-profit multinational corporations. They are the conduits for trade and investment necessary for national economic development in the era of nationalism, including national power and national dignity equated with technological advancement. Transnational civil society highlighting state agent systematic human rights abuses aim to pressure multinational corporations to boycott the offending state. Success may constitute one form of irresistible transnational public opinion pressure on the offending state. National intensive participation in the institutions of global capitalist production chains is a long-term necessity. MNC adoption of corporate social responsibility programs is evidence of some progress in highlighting global awareness of the political implications of economic consumption.

Public opinion here does not refer to public opinion surveys. Rather it refers to constituency demands to which the targets of these demands are more or less sensitive. The divergence between public opinion survey results and decision maker behavior is frequently evident. Core constituency support may be more important politically to professional politicians in the never-ending election cycle in a liberal democracy than more ephemeral public opinion survey responses. Social justice movement pressure on wealthy corporate political campaign donors is by definition a form of sustained public opinion pressure. Enhanced transparency to facilitate coordination of increasingly cosmopolitan constituency groups may facilitate building this public opinion pressure. Concomitantly, digital social media's rise also facilitates mobilization and coordination of militant ethno-nationalist movements, contributing to other trends in political polarization. The containment of this polarization will likely take the form of the securitization of polarization trends via the national security bureaucracy and the judiciary (DeDominicis, 2021).

The relationship of the nation state to human rights protection is a political dilemma. The capacities of the nation state include a greater capacity for statewide institution building. These institutions may also be used for enhancement and enforcement of human rights obligations as well as their violation. For example, American national military service policy has long been an arena for struggle to extend social justice protections: “‘It [male only US Selective Service military draft registration] imposes selective burdens on men, reinforces the notion that women are not full and equal citizens, and perpetuates stereotypes about men's and women's capabilities,” lawyers with the A.C.L.U. [American Civil Liberties Union] wrote in a petition on behalf of two men who were required to register and the National Coalition for Men” (Liptak, 2021, para. 7).

Ethnic minorities soliciting support from a perceived powerful nation state may be more prone to be stereotyped and targeted for suspicion as a fifth column. Yet the nation state may also deploy its diplomatic bargaining leverage for human rights effectively if it appears to be under universalistic, irresistible public opinion pressure. Diasporas are particularly vulnerable to this stereotyping dilemma. One traditionally, ascriptively marginalized population group is universal, i.e., the female component of humanity. A rhetorical tendency is to justify coercive state interventions and systemic abuse, e.g., Beijing in Xinjiang province, with references to protecting women's rights:

*“Chinese officials have denied abusing Uighur Muslims, justifying their establishment of mass detention camps as a necessary counterterrorism measure. The Chinese embassy in Washington, D.C., extended that defense by claiming that time in the “vocational education and training centers” liberated the Uighur women from the need to rear children.”*

*““The minds of Uyghur women in Xinjiang were emancipated and gender equality and reproductive health were promoted, making them no longer baby-making machines,” the Chinese Embassy tweeted Thursday. “They are more confident and independent.”” (Gehrke, 2021, para. 3-4).*

The US has justified its coercive intervention in Afghanistan also in terms of defending gender equality (Hakimi and Greenfield, 2021). These claims obfuscate the violation of national self-determination rights, the value demand for which is collectively more intense and whose salience if denied will override individual rights (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The globally high-profile rhetorical political conflicts generated challenge multinational corporate tactical contextual stability aims that underpin their globalized corporate strategic planning. For example, Afghanistan will not develop without significant foreign direct investment.

## CONCLUSION

This study has analyzed American political regime polarization trends that increase polity vulnerability to authoritarian populism. This study analyzed these political trends through process tracing utilizing the public record. It applied a social identity-based political psychological conceptualization of nationalism to analyze the Trump phenomenon in comparative, diachronic and synchronic perspective. Cross-partisan perception of a great power foreign adversary generates additional political incentivization for the securitization of the American polity.

Political efficacy at conflict circumvention involves undercutting collective national polity predispositions towards hardening stereotypes in the prevailing view of a perceived challenger. A stereotype is a gross oversimplification of the internal political dynamics of a perceived challenger, e.g., an “evil empire,” which obviates the real political complexity among dynamics within any polity (Reagan, 1983). Degeneration in collective polity capacity to perceive complexity correlates with increasing failure to perceive policy options to affect the target’s behavior, e.g., an evil empire allegedly understands and respects only force. A politically efficacious cosmopolitan human rights campaign inherently promotes national polity perception of political complexity, i.e.--the antipode to perceiving stereotypically--in the policy making processes within all polities. Elaboration of the particular challenges to human rights protection within each polity necessitates analysis of the idiosyncratic historical, institutional and sociological facets of each polity for dissemination to the global audience. Of course, this ideal-typical depiction is aspirational (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Global human rights movement organizations such as Amnesty International strive to provide such a neutral, unbiased assessment of the human rights conditions within each state.

The collective psychological predisposition to find points of consensual national political unity in the American vast post-1945 national security establishment is likely to focus on Beijing. In accordance with the adage, the enemy of my enemy is my friend, a collective process of scapegoating China will encourage cross-political cooperation in the polarized American polity. The counterbalance to perceiving an intense common threat is to see potential collaborators in terms of the positive ally stereotype (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). “Congress is also relatively unified on taking a tough stance on China” (Swanson, 2020, para. 16). A test case is US policy towards Taiwan. The incoming Biden administration invited “Taiwan’s top diplomat” in the US, Bi-khim Hsiao, to attend Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021 (“The World,” 2021). Effective cosmopolitan social justice movements are particularly significant also for working to undercut a Washington-Beijing conflict spiral. They would be successful if they deliver what are perceived within the prevailing view of national publics as impartial, unbiased uniform standard critiques of the human rights and global sustainability policy behavior of both states.

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