HISTORICAL ANALOGIES AND THE UKRAINE CRISIS: COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS OF INTERWAR GERMAN WITH POST-COLD WAR SERBIAN AND RUSSIAN IRREDENTISM AND WESTERN RESPONSES

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ABSTRACT

The paper comparatively analyzes the extended Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s with the current Ukraine crisis, focusing on the eve of the February 24, 2022, Russian invasion. It illustrates post-1989 recurrent political behavior patterns rooted in nationalist irredentism. The Soviet regime authorities did not permit the Russian Social Federated Republic to create its own republic-level Communist Party. The paper demonstrates that Russian internal Soviet diaspora populations in the Ukrainian republic were incentivized to self-identify with the Soviet state. De facto Russification of the Soviet state nevertheless functioned and alienated non-Russian national minorities. The disintegration of the USSR left internal Russophone diaspora identity in a comparatively fluid condition. European Union integration encouraged state building around the republic borders inherited from the Soviet era. Russophone elements within Ukraine faced inducements to self-identify with the titular nation exercising the core community function of the post-Soviet core community state. Political trend irredentist responses in the Russian polity intensified. They view the EU as fortifying the construction of a Ukrainian nation state. The analysis suggests that the prevailing view in Moscow perceived the EU is a proxy for extending US hegemony. Moscow demands great power national status equality in international diplomacy. Ukraine's partition is likely.

INTRODUCTION

A nation state is a state in which the overwhelming majority of citizens demonstrate their primary self-identification with the territorial community within the state boundaries. This demonstration refers to behavior by sacrifice of other values to support the sovereignty of the national community. This study utilizes the Cottam and Cottam (2001) political psychological framework for analyzing nationalism. Firstly, a nationalist is an individual who sees himself/herself as a member of a large group of people who constitute a community that is entitled to independent statehood and who is willing to grant that community a primary and the primary terminal loyalty. Secondly, nationalism characterizes a community when the modal, politically attentive citizen is a nationalist. A state territorial community acts nationalistically when the second condition is true, with regard to a particular community. If the community with which the nationalists identify does not have its own state, then this theoretical framework suggests that they will work to achieve one. By definition the attachment felt for this community will be the most important (terminal) one, and the community which a nationalist believes should have its own state will also be the largest community with which the nationalist identifies. When these conditions prevail, observers will see certain regular behavior patterns which we associate with nationalism.

This paper critiques the European Union as a peace strategy. The European Union won the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize (Cowell and Kulish, 2012). The main threat to peace in Europe is nationalism challenging internationally recognized territorial borders. One manifestation of nationalism is the political demand that an individual or group of people have that the members of a nation should live together in their own sovereign state. Most European states have peoples with more than one nation living within them. Most European nations are more or less divided among different European states. Frustration of nationalism produces intensely negative stereotypes and emotions towards the perceived barriers to creating a nation state. These barriers are frequently states perceived as representing or being controlled by other nations. The emotions include hatred and disgust. A result can be war and even genocidal violence. The European Union attempts to weaken the link between European nations and European states in the thoughts and emotions of the publics of the respective member states. Among the EU's member states, it promotes alternative values, including wealth prosperity and alternative identities, like being so-called European. Paradoxically this strategy critically relies upon the historical legacy of relatively effective states to utilize their power capacity to construct the European Union. In the case of Ukraine, integration with the EU functionally incentivizes the fortification of Ukrainian nationalism to support the Ukrainian state.

Nationalism as a communal motivation can associate with liberal values as well as with authoritarian values, depending upon the political context (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Nationalism associated with authoritarian order values in interwar Europe. In the latter Cold War period, West European nationalisms came to associate with liberal democratic values in opposition to the expansion of Soviet communist totalitarianism. European integration as a peace strategy aims functionally to associate and harness the political mobilization capacity of nationalism with liberal, i.e., "civil society" values (Hoxhaj, 2021, 169). This utilization includes state institutional reform and standardization to contain corruption on behalf of the so-called rule of law (Baraggia and Bonelli, 2022). Functionally, European integration has thereby fortified and encouraged Ukrainian nationalism after the 2014 "Revolution of Dignity" to support pro-Western Ukrainian nation state construction (Nakashidze, 2021, 65). The wide-range of effects of the intensification of international conflict between post-Soviet Russia and the US has accelerated functionally the Europeanization of Ukrainian nationalism (Stevis-Gridneff, Gibbons-Neff and Leveson, 2022).

A key issue is the relationship between the EU and the US. The USA is a nation state, the EU is not. Nation states are more prone to engage in collective stereotyping which leads to foreign policy failures and catastrophes (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The fact that the US is a democracy is significant, but nation state democracies can still stereotype targets, increasing the propensity towards use of deadly force, e.g., Vietnam and Iraq. The EU may need to contain the US which may see Europe increasingly as "degenerate," as Donald Rumsfeld did in 2003 leading up to the war in Iraq (DeDominicis, 2018b, 16, fn. 6). Instead, the EU appears to be enabling the US, rather than discouraging the US from overextending. "But overexpansion is a staple of IR [international relations], one not limited to Liberal states, and the narrative can be traced back to Thucydides" (Jervis, 2020, 442). The EU is cooperating with the US in confronting Moscow and Beijing. The multi-national EU confederation may not have the mobilization base to oppose the US. One might argue that another test of the EU in its relations with the US may include Ukraine. Observers should look for evidence of different views in Brussels and Washington as to how to deal with Moscow.

The paper begins with a review of selected scholarly literature regarding the conceptualization of nationalism as a foreign policy motivation. The regional empirical focus is twentieth and twenty-first century Europe and the global international system more broadly. It presents alternative explanations for the Cold War and the imputed foreign policy motivation for Moscow's belligerency towards Ukraine. It compares and contrasts Belgrade's irredentism towards the other former Yugoslav republics to illustrate the significance of the great comparative power differential between Serbia and Russia. This power differential impacts the international system's response to their respective challenge to internationally recognized state borders. The paper then focuses on outlining consequent, inferred strategies for conflict control and reduction to reach a ceasefire. It ends by highlighting the importance of an accurate consensual

understanding of the ultimate motivations of the US and the USSR during the Cold War for conflict resolution today. It notes that the prevailing view in Moscow is that the Soviet Union lost a defensive conflict to preserve its status against a NATO-led Western alliance. It perceives the US as seeing an opportunity to relegate Russia to second-rank global status through its EU proxy. The Ukraine conflict will likely remain a battleground in this conflict spiral with its roots in the Cold War.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Euromaidan

Vladimir Putin stated that the West was aiming to suppress and subjugate Russia's development (Axelrod, 2021). Moscow's prevailing view Western aid to Ukraine as reinforcing Ukrainian national attitudinal assumptions originally promoted by Soviet economic, political and cultural enforcement at Russia's expense (Putin, 2021). From this perspective, essential components of the Russian nation include territorial, ethnic and religious components that currently reside within the borders of neighboring, multi-ethnic and compound identity state of Ukraine. In a scenario in which Russia would forsake these irredenta, then Russian national identity including prevailing romantic symbol sets would have to evolve and change more rapidly. Comparisons include Greek nationalism's acquiescence to the loss of Smyrna/Izmir, and Finland's loss of Vyborg. This evolution may well occur regarding Serbian nationalism's focus on the territory of Kosovo. Russia, of course, has a power potential base that is much greater, so Russia will not acquiesce to this loss. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt opposed the EU's thrust to integrate Ukraine and Georgia into the EU political economic hegemony through formal agreements ("Helmut Schmidt," 2014).

The emergence of a perceived threat to Russia's prestige and identity connected with Ukraine, comparable to that of the Serbs in Kosovo, emerged over time. The Russian prevailing view historically has been that the area under Kiev was the cradle of Russian civilization, comparable to Serbia's claim to Kosovo. As Ukrainian nationalists gained disproportionate influence over Kiev's government policies due to its militancy, the attraction of Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO and EU) was strong and became stronger. The US and its EU allies encouraged this sentiment by publicly, blatantly siding with the Kiev Maidan Square protesters (the so-called Revolution of Dignity) in 2013. These protests, encouraged by Brussels and Washington, forced the democratically elected, pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, to resign and flee the country. Yanukovych in 2013 refused to sign an association agreement with the EU following a trade war in which Russia used its economic influence to raise the economic costs to signing such an agreement. Yanukovych determined that the costs would be too high, especially for his eastern Ukraine political base, to sign the EU association agreement, despite his earlier campaign promise to do so (Hosaka, 2018). Protests began in early 2014 and the Yanukovych government used deadly force to suppress them, with the interior ministry police killing several scores of protestors. Before these shootings, the first High Representative of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, went to Maidan Square to show the EU's solidarity with the protestors. So did US Senator John McCain. So, also did US Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland of the Obama administration, publicly handing out food to the protestors on the square. Nuland is again in the US State Department in the Biden administration. The Russians recorded her telephone calls, including one in which she castigated the EU for being too willing to negotiate with Moscow over the crisis (BBC, 2014b). This position parallels the Clinton administration placing primary responsibility on the Serbian authorities for "the resurgence of Serb nationalism" triggering the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia (Mujanovic, 2013, 131). Washington declined to support accommodating Serbian irredentist positions until exhausted stalemates led to de facto partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Harland, 2017). Freezing de facto partition while maintaining the fiction of sovereignty would be a pattern that also emerged in Kosovo (Mrdalj, 2020).

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has encountered intense, sustained resistance that some observers did not expect (Kirby, 2022). Rather than submit to annexation as did Czechoslovakia in losing the Sudetenland to

Germany, Ukrainian nationalism demonstrated its mass public prevalence through mobilization. London and Paris signaled to Prague that they would not militarily intervene to stop German annexation, which undercut Czech willingness to resist militarily. Ukrainian nationalists also note repeated NATO statements that NATO will not militarily intervene directly to confront Russian forces (Shear, 2022). NATO is supplying defensive weapons on a large scale as well as not obstructing individuals moving to Ukraine to fight on the Ukrainian side by the thousands (Engelbrecht, 2022, Crowley, 2022). As the mass violence continues through the months intensifying mutual hostility and zero-sum interaction, de facto partition of Ukraine along future ceasefire lines seems to a be a more plausible scenario.

Some observers view the conflict as a deadly struggle over the redrawn borders between Ukraine and its neighbors (Vause et al., 2022). The partition of Ukraine would likely involve forced population movements on a massive scale. Russian nationalism historically viewed the territory around Kiev as the founding settlement of Russian civilization. As of July 2022, "the Biden administration has concluded that the Russian leader still wants to widen the war and try again to seize Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital" (Baker and Sanger, 2022, para. 9). Russia has vastly greater power capability to pursue its irredentist aims that Belgrade did not have towards the rest of Yugoslavia. Belgrade may have not formally activated a plan for ethnic cleansing in Kosovo (DeDominicis, 2020). The rapidly escalating conflict dynamics were producing zero-sum maximal outcomes of forced population separation which NATO intervened to block. NATO is arguably unlikely to block a comparable outcome in Ukraine east of the Dnieper River (DeDominicis, 2018b). Precedent for forced population transfers emerged in the Soviet era as well as earlier in the Balkans and Anatolia (Özsu, 2013). *Jus cogens* has incorporated the results of population expulsions during and after the Second World War into international law (Lemberg, 2008). The prevailing view in Moscow may view such long-term recognition as inevitable.

An increasingly unlikely ceasefire scenario short of partition may include a high-level tactical component involving a constitutional restructuring of the Ukrainian state. It would conceivably involve joint NATO, EU and UN Security Council, i.e., Russian and Chinese, supervision. The political potentialities for it are rapidly dissipating along with the rapidly escalating fear, hatred and disgust functionally polarizing the community into zero-sum social competition. By way of historical analogy, the US came to discourage recognition of Serbia's nationalist grievances as a contestant in the Balkans. External actors imposed their own frames on the conflict in Yugoslavia, shifting from "ancient hatreds" to Slobodan Milosevic's own personal power drive to create "Greater Serbia" (King, 2007, 125). So, also the US is unlikely to deemphasize its characterization of Russia and specifically Putin as the primarily guilty party in Ukraine. Public declarations of Putin as a war criminal have lessen this political capacity to satisfy Russian regime stability and national dignity demands (Sanger, 2022).

Another trend eliminating this political capacity to negotiate a ceasefire short of partition is the strengthening of Ukrainian nationalism. It resists imposed political solutions that do not acknowledge equal Ukrainian national sovereignty. Ukrainian nationalist opposition was a factor blocking Zelenskyy's moves to implement the Steinmeier formula for implementing the long-stalled Minsk Accords (Deprez, 2019). They were the framework for overseeing the reintegration of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions into Ukraine. Named for the then German foreign minister, the Steinmeier plan aimed to agree on a sequence of steps overseen also by international observers including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Miller, 2019). Since then, Moscow has recognized these two regions as independent states. The Steinmeier formula may have been the last political opportunity to resolve the conflict short of partition. The opposition of Ukrainian nationalists did not allow Zelenskyy the decisional latitude to implement it after he announced his intention to move forward with it (Shevtsova, 2020). Russian government public statements by Foreign Minister Lavrov portrayed the US as prodding the Ukrainians not to implement the Minsk Accords (TASS, 2020). In April 2022, the Ukrainian government refused to meet with Frank-Walter Steinmeier, now President of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Kyiv, due to his perceived past willingness to appease Russia ("Zelensky Snub," 2022).

Ukrainian wartime mobilization illustrates the high salience and intensity of nationalism as a motivating value among its Ukrainian core community. It allows this constituency to dominate the Ukrainian political system. They evidently do constitute the modal citizenry, i.e., the most typical category of national identity citizen in Ukraine appears to be a Ukrainian primary terminal self-identifier. Before the 2022 invasion, their core organized street protests that Zelenskyy or any post-Yanukovych Ukrainian president was unlikely to suppress with coercion after the events of 2014. Their opposition narrowed the political decisional latitude available to Zelenskyy to move forward on the Steinmeier formula after he was elected. Several years previously, Yanukovych attempted and failed to suppress the so-called Revolution of Dignity and many scores of protestors were killed. The resolution of the conflict short of partition is unlikely, while the rest of Ukraine continues to integrate de facto with the West. Moscow's prevailing view perceives the attraction to the West increasing among the Ukrainian public. "In the eyes of Russian leaders, EU expansion is a stalking horse for NATO expansion" (Mearsheimer, 2014, para. 10).

International Strategic Environment

A main conceptual focus of this paper is collective, prevailing view of perception of motivation and relative capabilities of policy targets. Table 1 shows that this paper's framework rejects single factor causation in state behavior in international relations (Waltz, 1954). It favors opening the so-called black box, i.e. the polity system processes generating, managing and aggregating political inputs into foreign policy outputs (Yeoh, 2016). It proposes a hierarchical component system-linked motivational formula that shapes the general thrust of a state's foreign policy (Cottam, 1977). Assuming single-factor individual, bureaucratic, economic, power or international systemic determinism in overdetermining state foreign policy behavior is analytically deleterious. Conceptualizing political conflict resolution strategies require tactical foci components that emphasize multiple state and individual-level causal factors for state policy behavior. They dynamically interact with the changing intensity of mutually perceived challenge in relations among the great powers. Different constituencies within a polity serve as carrier vectors for these different motivations.

Table 1: An Inclusive Typology of Foreign Policy Motivations of a State

ECONOMIC	COMMUNAL	MESSIANISM	GOVERNMENTAL	DEFENSE
Loot	**National**	**Ideological**	**Bureaucratic Vested Interests (BVI)**	
	Independence		Foreign Policy and Defense Bureaucracies	
	Unity-Irredentism		Non-Defense Bureaucracies	
	Dignity		Military Vested Interests (MVI)	
	Grandeur			
Demographic	**Participant Excitement**	**Cultural**	**Personal Power—Internal**	
Economic Vested Interests (EVI) Defense	**Frontier Dynamics**	**Religious**	**Survival of the Regime**	
Trade Domestic Investments Foreign Economic Vested Interests			**Personal Power—External**	

Source: Data Summarized from Cottam, 1977, 31–53, Quoted from DeDominicis, 2018a, 5 The strategic environment in which state leaderships engage in diplomatic bargaining is essentially important for effective strategic foreign policy planning. In "A" state, e.g., the prevailing government view perceives "B" state's international belligerency as due to aggressive, imperialist motivations. "A" will respond signifcantly differently to "B"'s attempts at influence towards "A," than if "A" perceived "B"'s belligerence as motivated ultimately by defensive motivations. "A" may misperceive the ultimate source of "B" belligerency; if "B" is indeed belligerent due to perceived threat from "A," then "A"'s belligerent response due to contain "B" may reinforce "B"'s misperception of intense threat, heightening "B"'s belligerency. The outcome is a conflict spiral, i.e., escalating hostility due to mutual mispercetion of threat.

The two basic determinants in the strategic analysis and decision making of political actors are estimations of the motivation and relative capabilities of the other relevant actors. Foreign policy decision makers may make the mistake of inaccurately or incorrectly estimating both the motivations or the capabilities of other actors. A notorious case of a failed strategy is the strategy of "appeasement" in dealing with Nazi Germany. The functional basis of a foreign policy strategy, such as containment towards the Soviet Union, is the prevailing view's perception of the target's intentions/motivations and the target's capabilities. Failed strategies can emerge because of misperception of motivation, and also of relative capabilities. The greater the intensity of the external challenge which prevails within the initiator state, then the more vulnerable will the initiator state be to misperceptions of the intentions and capabilities of the target state. Table 2 shows an example of an outline of the so-called appeasement strategy using this paper's framework. It highlights its assumptions regarding the hierarchical systems relationship amongst constituency inputs into the 1938 German polity's foreign policy making process.

Table 2: The Basis of the 1938 "Appeasement" Strategy Was the Misperception That the Motivation for the Conflictual Belligerency of Hitlerian Germany as Being the Following

70%	A)	National dignity National unity National independence
20%	B)	Personal power external Economic vested interests
10%	C)	Ideological messianism

Source: DeDominicis, 2022, Adapted from Cottam, 1977 Appeasement is a state "A" foreign policy strategy towards a target, state "B," in which, the prevailing governmental "A" view is that "B"'s belligerency is due to "B"'s misperception that "A" aims to subordinate "B." By appeasing "B," "A" aims to change the prevailing view in "B" so that "B"'s prevailing government view ceases to view "A" as an existential threat to "B." "A"'s attempted satisfaction of "B"'s defensive national status equality drives focuses on accepted norms of international law, e.g., the right to full military preparation for self-defense. Inaccurate inference of Hitlerian Germany's belligerency as due to the intention to dismember, disarm and weaken Germany was the critical foundational assumption of the appeasement strategy. In fact, German belligerency was due to perceived imperial opportunity.

Table 3 shows the actual hierarchical systems relationship amongst constituency inputs into the 1938 German polity's foreign policy making process. The tragedy of appeasement was rooted in its misperception of the ultimate sources of German belligerency. Appeasement functionally served to confirm Hitler's articulation of the image of political degeneracy of Nazi Germany's great power interlocutors (see table 4). The appeasement strategy thereby functionally confirmed the validity of Hitler's worldview among the Nazi regime authorities. It functioned to increase Hitler's domestic authority, making Germany more belligerent and aggressive, rather than pacifying it.

Table 3: In Reality, the Motivational System in 1938 Hitlerian Germany Corresponded with the Following

85%	A)	Personal power -- external
		    National grandeur
		    Participant excitement

10%	B)	Military vested interests Economic vested interests
5%	C)	Bureaucratic vested interests – foreign policy/defense National security

Source: DeDominicis, 2022, Adapted from Cottam, 1977 Hitlerian Germany belligerency at the 1938 Munich conference was in due ultimately to a prevailing Berlin worldview of outstanding political opportunity to establish German hegemony. Hitler would be the leader-dictator of a dominant Germany in this new European and world order. It would extend well beyond compensating for the perceived national humiliation of Germany's dismemberment, personal loss and economic sanctioning and dislocation since the Versailles Treaty. The Nazi self-serving prevailing view that the regime had far outperformed the hopelessly disorganized great power adversaries of Germany during extended interwar crises readily encouraged this worldview. The appropriate strategy should have been a variant of containment. Appeasement inadvertently confirmed the degenerate image (see Table 4).

In order for Nazi Germany collectively to have this motivational system, the authorities had to see a world which allowed it collectively functionally to justify this motivational system. To rephrase, the prevailing view of the external political environment was one in which it saw a marvelous opportunity to expand its influence. The main facet of this worldview was that the other great power actors had similar capabilities but lacked the will and determination to use them. They lacked this will and determination because they had become degenerate. This gross stereotypical misperception led to a foreign policy strategic disaster. A stereotype is an oversimplified perceptual image of the target. Table 4 shows Case 1: The prevailing view in the polity of Nazi Germany perceived the US, France, UK, USSR as degenerate. The relevant foreign policy elements of the "degenerate" stereotype apply if this stereotype is the prevailing view in the foreign policy making process.

Table 4: Case 1-The Critical Political Strategic Elements of This Stereotypical Degenerate Prevailing View Within the Initiator Regarding the Target Are the Following

1)	**Motivation:**	Confused
2)	**Decisional locus:**	Incremental – no coordination
3)	**Decisional style:**	Disorganized to the point of confusion
4)	**Capability:**	Lacks will and determination (i.e., the opposite of the prevailing view perception of Self within the initiator polity held by the governing authorities)
5)	**Prevailing view within the initiator polity towards internal political dissenters/opposition:**	Effete (i.e., they are agents/vectors of degeneracy)

Source: Data Adapted from Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 98. Quoted from DeDominicis, 2018a, 9 Hitlerian Germany's Lebensraum strategy included the foundational inference that Nazi Germany possessed a sufficient power potential base relative to its all its great power adversaries to attempt and achieve world domination. The belief that Germany had the power capability to place global hegemony acquisition within its range of feasible policy options indicates that a collective political psychological approach is useful to explain this worldview. The key factor differentiating Nazi German from its great power targets was the perceived exponentially greater collective will and determination of Germany under Nazi leadership and control. Germany's targets were critically unable to organize themselves to respond effectively to a forceful, sustained German challenge which had first overcome its internal degenerate opponents.

From the point of view of the leadership of this authoritarian populist regime, a commitment to international cooperation is foolish with regard to "degenerate" states. Instead, a virile, worldwide Pax Romana-type strategy is necessary to exploit the opportunity to assume and provide global leadership, i.e., predominance. Figure 1 summarizes the prevailing definition of Germany's international political environment as collectively perceived in 1939 Berlin, as if analogously perceived by a single individual.

Table 5 summarizes the ideal-typical image stereotype extremes of policy targets to which the foreign policy behavior of nation states is comparatively more prone to conform. Policy behavior patterns outlined in Table 6 conform with these images along with intensifying perception of challenge. This challenge can be threat or opportunity perceived as confronting the initiator state.

Figure 1: The International System, 1939 German Prevailing View

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                                    Ally
                                     │
                      Japan         │  Italy
                                     │
                                     │
                                     │
                                     │
Degenerate ──────────────────── Complex ──────────────────── Colonial
                                     │
           UK, France               │              Egypt
           USA, USSR                │              Syria
                                     │              Turkey
                                     │              Greece
                                     │              Poland, Czechoslovakia
                                     │              Yugoslavia, Romania
                                     │              Hungary
                                     │
                  Norway            │  Denmark
                  Belgium           │  Netherlands
                                     │
                                     │
                            Degenerate Proxy      (Source: DeDominicis, 2022, adapted from
                                                   Cottam, 1994,192)
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
Figure 1 depicts the prevailing worldview of the 1939 Nazi German regime. Drawing on the findings from cognitive balance theory, allies are positively stereotyped. Lesser powers are perceived derivatively in terms of their stereotyped role in the international system dominated by the great powers. In addition to perceived relative power potential base, stereotyping also reflects perceived cultural level of the target polity, i.e., in today's terms, their level of technological development. The typology of images/stereotypes is summarized in Table 5. The strategic policy behavior consequences are summarized in Table 6. Stereotyping is more frequent within the polities of nation states such as Germany, Japan, Russia and the United States, ceteris paribus. Stereotypes as the foundations for strategy leads to strategic catastrophes.

Table 5: Image Attributes of a Perceived Source of Challenge (I.E., Threat or Opportunity)

Image/ Stereotype	Capability (as perceived/ stereotyped)	Culture (as perceived; today, tends to be equated with perceived technological proficiency)	Intentions (as perceived/ stereotyped)	Decision Makers (as perceived/ stereotyped)	Threat/ Opportunity (as perceived/ stereotyped)
"Enemy"	Equal	Equal	Harmful	Small elite	Threat
"Barbarian"	Superior	Inferior	Harmful	Small elite	Threat
"Imperial"	Superior	Superior	Harmful	A few groups	Threat
"Colonial"	Inferior	Inferior	Benign	Small elite	Opportunity
"Degenerate"	Superior or equal	Weak-willed	Harmful	Confused, differentiated	Opportunity
"Rogue"	Inferior	Inferior	Harmful	Small elite	Threat
"Ally"	Equal	Equal	Good	Many groups	Threat (from a shared enemy, i.e., the enemy of my enemy is my friend)

Source: quoted from Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 98 Stereotyping in image formation demonstrates patterns that move towards the ideal-typical forms e.g., outlined in Table 4 (degenerate) and Table 7 (enemy) concomitantly with the greater intensity of perceived external challenge. Image formation towards lesser powers will tend to be derivative of the overarching definition of the international situation framed by the perceived relationships among the great powers. Great powers embedded in a conflict spiral may derivatively perceive lesser powers as sources of opportunity, i.e., colonial or degenerate, to assist in prevailing over the perceived high level strategic threat from a great power. Lesser powers perceived according to the colonial framework become targets for the competitive expansion of metropole influence and control responding to the challenge from other great powers.

These perceptual stereotypes associate with psychological behavioral pattern predispositions that, in turn, become the basis for derivate group behavior orientations by the perceiver as outlined in Table 6. Table 6 shows the general political strategic thrust of an actor towards a target in an ideal-typical typology of image stereotypes. The foreign policy making process relevant components of the stereotype images relevant for this analysis are outlined in subsequent tables.

Table 6: "Images and Policy Predispositions"

Image of Perceived Challenger	General Policy Predispositions Towards Perceived Challenger	Policy Predispositions Towards Perceived Challenger in Intense Conflicts
"Enemy"	Wary suspicion, containment	Hostility, defense
"Barbarian"	Fear, form alliances	Preemptive strikes, precipitate alliance intervention (potential for genocide)
"Imperial"	When domination is stable: fear, avoid conflict, submit	When conflict is unstable: anger, shame, struggle for liberation
"Colonial"	Paternalistic policy guidance and direction	Most commonly nonviolent repression
"Degenerate"	Contempt, mobilize for competition	Disgust, offensive aggression
"Rogue"	Derogate, isolate	Hostility, violent repression (potential for genocide)

Source: quoted from Cottam and Cottam 2001, 121 Identifiable behavior patterns tend to associate with particular images that the actor holds towards the target. The rhetoric of state decision makers is one part of evidence for analysis to use to infer state foreign policy motivation. The leaders of aggressive, imperialist actors inevitably portray their policies in terms of victimhood and defensive motivations. Hitlerian Germany's relative power potential base firmly placed it within the first rank great power status. Vladimir Putin's Russia appears to have stereotyped Ukraine as a degenerate actor subject to colonialism by a threatening US-led NATO/EU alliance. Moscow's perception of opportunity towards Ukraine was significantly derivative of its perceived threat ultimately from Washington. The economic component of Russia's power potential base is equivalent to that of Italy.

The appropriate strategy for countering Hitlerian Germany was rather containment. Appeasement inadvertently confirmed and reinforced the degenerate image of 1938 Germany's foreign policy targets, a stereotype promoted whose advocates included Hitler. Tragically, appeasement therefore contributed to a greater likelihood of the outbreak of war. By the end of the 1940s, the American prevailing view became that, in effect, the Soviet Union was a Russian version of Nazi Germany, and the appropriate strategic response would be containment (Cottam, 1977). The latter strategy would deny the Soviet leadership the imperial expansion and glory that it allegedly needed for the totalitarian Soviet regime to survive and thrive domestically. Appeasement was, in effect, a détente strategy. It was an approach whose prevailing assumption was that the belligerency of Germany was due to suspicion of imperial motivations of the allied powers towards Germany. By accommodating post-Versailles Germany's demands for return to the ranks of the European great powers, Germany would reemerge as a status quo power.

The question of the ultimate source of Russian belligerency since 2013 towards Ukraine and the West is an essentially important issue. If Russian foreign policy motivations are to re-create the Russian empire in post-Soviet garb, then appeasing Russian expansion would be dangerous. If Russian foreign policy is ultimately rather the system of foreign policy motivations outlines in Table 12, then a containment strategy may functionally serve to reinforce the prevailing perception of threat in Moscow. A containment strategy against a defensively belligerent state risks intensifying a conflict spiral. This writer has argued elsewhere that the Cold War may have been a case of a conflict spiral, i.e., mutual misperception of aggressive, ultimately imperialist belligerency by Moscow and Washington (DeDominicis, 2021). Post-Soviet Russia, as a nation state, unlike the multi-national USSR, is more prone towards stereotyping and belligerency, ceteris paribus (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Figure 2 summarizes the prevailing definition of Russia's international political environment as collectively perceived in February 2022 Moscow, as if analogously viewed by a single individual.

The respective prevailing views within US and USSR polities collectively perceived each other during the most intense periods of the Cold War as a "diabolical enemy," e.g., US President Ronald Reagan's characterization of the USSR as an "Evil Empire" (Hall, 2015). The foreign policy-relevant elements of the "Diabolical Enemy" stereotype are outlined in Table 7, Case 2.

Figure 2: The State System, February 2022 Russian Prevailing View (I.E., Eve of Invasion of Ukraine)

(Source: DeDominicis, 2022, adapted from Cottam, 1994, 192)

The Putin administration's definition of the international situation focuses on the US threat to Russian unity and international status and regime stability (see Table 12). Russia's imperial aggression towards Ukraine stereotyped the latter as degenerate, self-servingly and disastrously dismissing the strength of Ukrainian nationalism. The initial failure of Russian invasion to achieve its objectives in the face of massive Ukrainian resistance highlights the intensity of perceived threat in Moscow from the international system. The consequence of this gross misreading is likely to be the further intensification of perceived threat including the intensifying orientation towards scapegoating and conspiracy postulation. The diminution of the Russian middle class due Russia's economic isolation will lessen resistance to these tendencies.

Table 7: Case 2-The Critical Political Strategic Elements of This "Diabolical Enemy" Stereotypical Prevailing View Within a Government of a Target Are the Following

1)	Motivation:	Evil
2)	Decisional locus:	Monolith
3)	Decisional style:	Highly rational
4)	Capability:	Derived from the purported goodness and naivete heretofore dominant within the perceiving, initiator polity, hobbling its collective comprehension of and mobilization against the threat (i.e., the opposite of the perception of the nature of the threatening Other, target polity.)
5)	Prevailing view within the initiator polity towards internal political dissenters/opposition regarding the portrayal of the target as a diabolical enemy:	Dupes at best, or, at worst traitors

Data adapted from Cottam and Cottam, 2001, 96-98, 108. Quoted from DeDominicis, 2018a The image pattern formation tendency of perceived sources of intensifying threat display propensities towards the so-called enemy stereotype under the following conditions: the target is perceived as roughly equal in capability level and cultural level. The enemy image characterized the American prevailing view of the USSR particularly during the early Cold War period. Previous work by this author argues that the Soviet leadership mirrored this (mis)perception of US motivation, albeit at a lesser intensity, indicating that the Cold War was at its foundation a conflict spiral (DeDominicis, 2021). The Putin administration is more likely to assume that US concerns regarding 2022 Moscow's belligerent foreign policy motivations are rather self-serving justifications for the US' own quest for seeking American hegemony via Russian subjugation.

In this stereotypical worldview, an effective containment strategy is necessary to deter the highly rational, inherently expansionist, monolithic enemy from aggression. Failure to deter otherwise risks loss of control over local crisis situational dynamics escalating to direct military confrontation. The highly rational enemy must not doubt the will and determination of the defender to resist to prevent the aggressor's prospective victory. Failure to project the requisite will and determination risks encouraging the aggressor. Consequent destabilizing imperial expansion drives increase the prospect of the defender having to choose between

escalation to military confrontation or acquiescence, i.e., further appeasement. In the latter case, the cycle of imperial expansion will intensify, leading to the next crisis but with even less credibility to display the ultimate willingness to resist by the defender. As in the case of Hitlerian Germany at the 1938 Munich conference, appeasement will ultimately serve to confirm the perception of target degeneracy. It thereby reinforces the predisposition towards intensely aggressive imperialism. The post-1945 nuclear setting made demonstrating adequate will and determination to resist a more imminent concern. In contrast to the international system in the late 1930s, useful comparisons may be made with the international system on the eve of the First World War, as an example of a conflict spiral. Belligerency and expansion may be motivated by ultimately defensive motivations as well as aggressive, imperialist drives. The aphorism, the best defense is a good offense, captures the former. An accurate depiction of the motivations for Russian international belligerency in 2022 is critical for formulating an appropriate strategy to avoid loss of control over escalatory dynamics.

Table 8 highlights the danger of a conflict spiral producing war. Each actor is ultimately defensively motivated but misperceives the belligerency of their great power adversary as ultimately stemming from imperialist, aggressive motivations. Hence, acquiescence to the opponents demands will only make the opponent more aggressive due to failure to demonstrate the will and determination to meet force with force to contain the other. The First World War was a great power conflict rooted in defensive motivations. This analysis proposes that Russia in February 2022 viewed Ukraine in terms parallel to 1914 Vienna's prevailing view regarding Belgrade. Hence a conflict resolution strategy for the Ukraine war requires a critical focus on Moscow-Washington political strategic interaction. Mutually shared misperceptions of aggressive imperial intent among the great powers contributed to a conflict spiral leading up to what became the First World War. It rapidly escalated in response to a lesser power's involvement in the June 1914 assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne.

Table 8: The International Political System, Six Weeks Prior to Outbreak of World War I

State Actor	Power Potential Base	Intensity of Perceived Challenge from External Political Environment	Direction of Perceived Challenge
UK	1	5	Threat
France	1	5	Threat
Austria-Hungary	2	4	Threat (but Opportunity towards Serbia for restoring the empire in the view of other major powers by subjugating Belgrade)
Italy	2	5	Threat
Germany	1	5	Threat
Russia	1	5	Threat
USA	1	7	Threat

Source: DeDominicis, 2022, adapted from Cottam, 1977 Utilization of historical analogies to analyze Russian foreign policy motivation for the 2022 Ukraine invasion should include the outbreak of what became the First World War. In Table 8 above, the Great War was the result of a conflict spiral. Austria-Hungary, weakened by centrifugal nationalist predispositions of varying intensity, was a second-rank power. The assassination of the heir to the throne provided Vienna the derivative opportunity towards Serbia to reassert its lost first rank great power credentials by eliminating Belgrade as an actor. Claims of valid historical parallels with Moscow's behavior towards Ukraine would imply that Russian foreign policy motivation is closer to that formula assumed for the appeasement strategy towards Germany. Table 2 outlines this assumption, invalid regarding Germany.

The images which the great powers had of each other were complex. Six weeks prior to what became the start of the war, the international system witnessed a rapid shift in these images from complex understandings of each other to stereotypes. In formulating a peace strategy amidst the current Ukraine crisis, an accurate understanding of Russian ultimate foreign policy motivation is necessary to avoid further conflict escalation. Vienna saw an opportunity to "restore the Empire's prestige by subduing Serbia" (Lyon, 2015, 116). Vienna saw a threat from burgeoning nationalism to its multinational empire including Serb minorities attracted to neighboring Serbia. The essential perceptual dynamic of an international spiral conflict which also resulted in World War I involves mutual misperception of threat. The leadership of State A fears that the leadership of a perceived "diabolical enemy," State B, sees State A as "degenerate."

So, State A is belligerently defensive to demonstrate its virility and will and determination to resist so as to prevent further aggression from state B.

If state B has the same fear towards State A, then the result is a self-reinforcing vicious circle of mutual misperception of threat. Each side's defensive efforts confirm the misperception of aggressive intent which the target of the defensive policy has towards what is, in reality, another defensive power. A conflict spiral is an international conflict which intensifies due to mutual misperception of threat. It is the consequence of a wrong estimation of the intentions/motivations of a belligerent actor in international relations as being expansionist, when it is really defensive. An actor's policy emerges of assertive defense in the form of containment, i.e., demonstrating its will, determination and resolve to fight and sacrifice to resist aggression. The target's fear then increases, and it becomes even more belligerent, and open warfare becomes a possibility. A containment policy towards defensively motivated actors increases the potential for the loss of escalatory control over situational dynamics, leading to a foreign policy disaster.

During the early Cold War, the US polity, i.e., the political elite factions and their respective constituencies, came to share a consensus in seeing a great threat from the USSR (Hook, 2019). An important question was whether their perception of Soviet foreign policy motivation was accurate. To rephrase, was the Cold War ultimately a spiral conflict. The analyst faces the task of determining whether a state acts belligerently because it is defensively motivated. Or is it belligerent because it really is an imperialist state perceiving an ultimate marvelous opportunity on the international stage. Hitlerian Germany's belligerency was due to a motivation and perceived opportunity to engage in world domination for the grandeur of the nation and its leadership. A path towards a solution lies in determining the answers to the following 3 questions: 1) the belligerent state's priority for peaceful resolution of conflict; 2) the belligerent state's satisfaction with level of influence exercised in the world; 3) the belligerent state's satisfaction with the actor system. The image intensity (stereotype) which characterizes the prevailing view of the public will show up in terms of the polity's collective willingness to sacrifice to meet the external challenge. This stereotypical prevailing view will also be dependent on capability self-image. The threatening state's predisposition to act through its foreign policy process output will significantly depend on the extent and intensity of this stereotype imagery within the public. As of February 2022, the Putin administration's policy behavior patterns towards Washington appeared to accept the global status quo. In this worldview, Washington challenged this status quo by expanding so-called Euro-Atlantic structures into the former Soviet bloc. Moscow did not appear to indicate that it perceives itself as confronting a global environment of surrounding great power political degeneracy offering a marvelous global strategic opportunity. Such a worldview would require Moscow's prevailing view to include an estimation that it possesses a great mobilizational capability advantage. This superior will and determination would enable it to overturn the US-dominated international order. For example, due to the prospect of default on its foreign debt due to US-led economic sanctions on Russia, Moscow has threatened to "sue." According to Russian finance minister, the government "undertook all necessary action so that investors would receive their payments" (Ponciano, 2022, para. 5).

This analysis implies that the foreign policy leadership of an initiator state needs to build in tests into the foreign policy to determine the accuracy of comprehension of the intentions of the target. Stereotyping is law-like in its regularity under particular conditions. As an oversimplification of both intention and capability, it is a pathological tendency in making foreign policy and international political strategy more broadly. As stereotypes of the external world constitutes the prevailing view in a political system, changing them becomes politically difficult. Demagogues manipulating simplistic symbolic representations of the international environment will tend to have a domestic political competitive advantage. Nationalistic communities and nation states, e.g., Russia, China and the US, are more prone to perceive external challenges and to stereotype them. They demonstrate a greater relative vulnerability to generate a a prevailing view converging on a stereotypical image of other actors/targets in the external environment. Nationalism associates with stereotyping and the affect that associates with it (Cottam and Cottam, 2001).

A political observer who does not stereotype will have a complex image of the foreign policy making process within the target actor. Perceiving political complexity is necessary to formulate effective political strategies. These strategies are more likely to dynamically influence perceptual, attitudinal and value trends among relevant foreign policy constituencies within the target polity. Table 9 shows the policy making relevant perceived qualities of the polity target that a policy initiator avoiding stereotyping displays. This policy maker perceiving complexity portrays this complex image of the target in political interlocution with policy making cohorts. The complex image portrays the target as having a politically complex foreign policy making process, including Putin's Russia.

Table 9: A Policy Initiator Rejecting Stereotypical Imagery Perceives Political Complexity within the Policy Making Process of the Policy Target. This Initiator More Likely Articulates Policy Recommendations on the Bases of the Following Assumptions Relevant for Foreign Policy Political Strategy

1)	Motivation of the target:	1) describes rather than judges the motivation as evil or good 2) sees of number of component interests (motivations) and coming up with a policy that satisfies all of them is very difficult
2)	Decisional locus of the target:	The leadership provides some coordination for a large number of competing, functional organizations.
3)	Decisional style of the target:	Incremental, with decision makers immersed in details.
4)	Capability of the target:	Sees capability in terms of a full range of objective factors, implicitly paralleling Hans J. Morgenthau's list of national power components (1988).
5)	Prevailing view within the initiator polity towards internal political dissenters/opposition regarding the portrayal of the target as complex:	Disagreements are inevitable, but those who advance a stereotypical view are demagogues seeking political power.

Source: Quoted from DeDominicis, 2021, 77 Stereotype imagery of policy targets leads to greater likelihood for loss of control over conflict dynamics. Stereotypes are perceptual pattern simplifications that are dysfunctional in terms of planning political strategic policy towards a target because they overlook political influence capacities. Stereotyping of the target as degenerate risks significantly overestimating the initiator/perceiver state's relative power capability. Hitlerian Germany's prevailing view that achieving global domination lie within its policy option range with the Nazi leadership providing the necessary will and determination is a stark example. Other cases derivative of conflict spirals include the Putin administration's initial overestimation of its ability to impose its political will on Kiev and American overestimation of its capacities in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

In sum, an observer having a complex image of a target will see the following key elements. The perceived motivation of the target will be perceived as a complex mix of motivations, and reconciling them is difficult. The perceived decisional locus of target will highlight a large number of functional organizations with coordination and some policy leadership from above. The perceived decisional style of target will be perceived as incremental and decision makers will be aware at best only partially of major systemic policy patterns. The perceived capability of the target will involve the perception of a full range of capability factors which implicitly parallels Morgenthau's list (1988). A political actor perceiving complexity will tend to view those compatriots who disagree with this complex portrayal of the target as due to inevitable, but individuals advancing a near-stereotypical view of the target will be suspected of demagoguery.

Derivative stereotypes of weaker powers emerge in this world political context of intense great power conflict. A political paradox emerges.Nationalistic appeals are useful for a leader to mobilize community resources for creating foreign policy instruments for influence expansion, but they associate with stereotyping. The leader's decisional latitude in terms of the range of foreign policy options available to the state leader is usually more narrow. During an international crisis, a nation state polity is more prone to perceive an intense external challenge (threat or opportunity). Nationalistic communities demonstrate greater decisional latitude for the decision making elite to devote polity resources to expand international influence. They show a greater political ability to mobilize a greater proportion of the community's resources, to adopt policies to meet the perceived intense threat/opportunity. Concomitantly, the national state leadership has less decision latitude for withdrawal and toleration of perceived national humiliation while domestically surviving politically (Cottam and Cottam, 2001).

Making nationalistic values more salient by these normative active appeals raises the likelihood of misperception through stereotyping. Collective emotional affect intensifies along with nationalistic mobilization of the public to address an external challenge, i.e., threat or opportunity. These emotions include hate, fear, rage, disgust, contempt, joy, envy, and others. Nationalistic leaders of nation states are more prone to overestimate their state's relative power capabilities. *New York Times* editorialist Maureen Dowd (2022, para. 23) quotes one observer of authoritarian populists: "One of the great truths of history is that the great deceivers also deceive themselves." Table 10 shows the contours of the 1938 international political system, i.e., the essential nature of the political relationships among the great powers. Such states have comparative potential power bases that place them in first and second rank in power capability. They can, if they choose, determine their own foreign policy aims rather than consistently defer to the foreign policy aims of other more powerful allies and adversaries as do lesser powers, by definition. The intensity and direction of perceived challenge from the external political environment within the prevailing view within each state determines its commitment of its power resources. These resources are diverted from domestic consumption allocation to create diplomatic bargaining instruments, e.g., military instruments and foreign aid (Cottam, 1977, Cottam and Gallucci, 1978). In 1938, the prevailing view in London and Paris mistakenly assumed that the ultimate source of German belligerency derived from Berlin perceiving threat. Prevailing views in London and Paris held a tragically flawed understanding of their international political environment.

Table 10: The International Political System at the Time of the Munich Agreement In 1938

State Actor	Power Potential Base	Intensity of Perceived Challenge	Direction of Perceived Challenge
US	1	4	Threat
UK	1	3	Threat
France	1	2	Threat
Germany	1	1	Opportunity
Italy	2	1	Opportunity
USSR	1	3	Threat
China	2	1	Threat
Japan	2	1	Opportunity

Source: DeDominicis, 2022, adapted from Cottam, 1977 The prevailing view in London in 1938 was that German belligerency derived from perception of existential threat by Berlin from the external environment. London's foreign policy adopted the appeasement strategy with the aim of thereby transforming Germany into a status quo power. In reality Hitlerian Germany's belligerency was due to perception of surrounding political degeneracy. It pointed to a marvelous opportunity if Germany and its allies had the will and determination to seize it. Appeasement (see table 2) disastrously (mis)confirmed the prevailing view of degeneracy (see table 4) portraying London and Paris' willingness to compromise as confirmatory evidence. Hitler was a main advocate of this worldview; appeasement strengthened his position further within the German polity, making war more likely, not less.

During the Cold War, a critical issue was whether the Soviet Union was belligerent because its leadership saw a great opportunity or a dangerous threat from the external environment. Table 11 describes an international spiral conflict, i.e., a conflict based on mutual misperception of threat.

Table 11: During the Latter Stage of the Cold War (as Postulated by the Author)

State Actor	Power Potential Base	Intensity of Perceived Challenge	Direction of Perceived Challenge
US	1	4	Threat
USSR	1	3	Threat
European Community	1	5	Threat
India	2	5	Threat
China	2	1	Threat
Japan	2	9	Threat

Source: DeDominicis, 2022, adapted from Cottam, 1977 This portrayal of the international system characterizes the Cold War as a conflict spiral. A lesson learned from the debacle of interwar appeasement was that appeasing a militantly imperialist power would intensify its aggressiveness by appearing to confirm the aggressor's perception of political degeneracy and opportunity. The prevailing view by the late 1940s emerged in Washington was that USSR was basically a Russian version of Nazi Germany. An effective global containment strategy was therefore necessary to prevent Moscow from the expansionist imperial glory it allegedly needed to maintain its harshly coercive regime domestically. The enemy stereotype (Table 7) of the USSR contributed to the general failure to predict the peaceful fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR itself (DeDominicis, 2014).

Variations in the satisfaction of nationalist values can explain the difference in levels of violence in the breakup of the Soviet Union in comparison to Yugoslavia. Differences in Serb and Russian nationalism-centered issues explain why Yugoslavia degenerated into war in the 1990s while the USSR did not.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This analysis is predominantly a deductive analysis highlighting the application of image theory for analyzing the Yugoslav and Ukraine crises since the end of the Cold War. It relies upon the public record given its focus on international system developments since the early twentieth century. It utilizes triangulation with recent selected scholarly literature in accordance with this deductive approach. It thereby engages in process tracing for explaining the current European-centered conflicts in the international system.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Yugoslavia's Disintegration

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, like the USSR, was a multinational state in which one group, in this case the Serbs, was numerically dominant. It was foremost in the military officer corps (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The 1974 Constitution reflected Tito's long-term aim to prevent the Serbs from becoming politically predominant. It gave Kosovo and Vojvodina more power and autonomy; both provinces had their own assembly as well as representation in the Serb assembly, and they also had seats on the rotating presidency. In this way, Serbian ethnic and national community political influence was less, and other republics received reassurance that Serbia would be unable to control the federal government. Pressures began to mount for change in the constitution as economic conditions continued to deteriorate and nationalism grew in the republics. Also at this time, political and economic horse-trading came to focus on the constitution. In exchange for concessions on economic reforms in 1986, for example, Slovenia gave up its turn to the Yugoslav Presidency to Bosnia (Cottam et al., 2015, referencing Woodward, 1995).

The political situation of Serbs within the Yugoslavian national state became increasingly galling to Serbian nationalists. This constitutional arrangement deprived Serbian nationalists of what they viewed as their natural, complete power base within the Yugoslavian state (Stojanović, 2021). They viewed the Vojvodina and Kosovo autonomous regions within the Serbian republic as constituting part of their natural power base. This constitutional arrangement, in their view, also deprived them of Kosovo, which was a central symbol of Serbian nationalism. They regarded Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian civilization. The small portion of the population of Kosovo as Serb, the rest being Albanian, contributed to the conflict because of the symbolic importance of Kosovo and the claim that Serbs were being expelled (Mehmeti, 2021).

Ultimately, under the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, the Communist Party co-opted these Serbian nationalists which had mobilized. Milosevic appealed to Serb nationalism to defeat party rivals with less of an inclination toward radical nationalism. Milosevic constructed a complex political coalition (Musić, 2019). He first defeated the liberal wing of the party. Then, he used the party machine to from a broad coalition of Serbs which the common bond of Serbian nationalism united (Silber and Little, 1997). Workers from all strata, as well as urban and rural levels, as along with communists and anti-communists and Serbian members of the military and police constituted his coalition. The movement emerged as "a hybridization of Serbian nationalism and Leninist socialism under the umbrella of anti-bureaucratic populism" (Grdesic, 2016, 775). In the federal government, Milosevic managed to gain de facto control of the votes of Kosovo, Vojvodina, and the republic of Montenegro. The upsurge of Serbian nationalism in general followed the pattern an observer should expect from a nationalistic people in this context. In sum, they believe that they, in comparison with other groups, have suffered from mistreatment and deprivation of natural rights. Also necessary is the prevailing belief that they have the capability for autonomous statehood (Cottam and

Cottam, 2001). The differences in the number of casualties and the extent of destruction quantifies the difference between the departures of Slovenia and Croatia. In a brief conflict with few deaths, the Yugoslav army attempted to prevent Slovenia from leaving the federation. An agreement between the Serbian and Slovenian leadership to stop the hostilities and, in fact, permit Slovenia to secede produced the end of the hostilities (Silber and Little, 1997). This agreement announced the end of Yugoslavia as a federation. It also announced the end of the Yugoslavian army as the military force of that federation. Hereafter, it was now the Serbian army. The Serbian leadership would use it in a much more destructive war to prevent Croatia in 1991 from seceding with a large Serbian population. "[A]fter mass desertions of the nonSerbs – the JNA [the Yugoslav federal army] had become basically Serb-dominated and this enabled Milosevic to pose as its real leader instead of the federal authorities" [*sic*] (Oproiu, 2011,149).

Cottam and Cottam (2001) note that several perceptual factors caused the difference in these wars. Firstly, unlike the Croats and Serbs, the Slovenes and Serbs did not have a history of ethnic genocidal conflict. Serb historical memory of relations with Croatia evoked the Serbian sense that they must protect their own national kindred from potential annihilation. In their view, they supported annexation of the territory which the Serb nation deserved, and which oppressors had denied for so long (Kataria, 2015). Secondly, meanwhile, the pattern which the Croats followed anticipated the pattern which this framework would expect when a people hold the barbarian image of their opponent (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Croatian President Tudjman's advisers pushed him to declare war on the Yugoslavian army and leave the federation as well after Slovenia successfully seceded. Yet Tudjman continued to place his hope in alliances along with international recognition as the means to provide him with the leverage which he would need to avoid war. He did not want to take on the Yugoslavian army (Silber and Little, 1997).

Thirdly, Cottam and Cottam (2001) argue the degenerate image of Croatia and its international supporters appeared to be the prism through which Serbian leaders perceived them. The Serbian leadership perceived the Croats themselves as relatively similar to the Serbs in terms of cultural sophistication and also in terms of capability. This image prevailed when the Yugoslavian army was truly the army of the Yugoslavian state. By 1991, the Serbs held a degenerate image of the Croats as a lens through which to perceive their behavior because the Serban leadership collectively saw, firstly, opportunity. The authorities aimed to unite Serbs in a territory complementary to the nation. Milosevic's policies succeeded in transforming the Yugoslav federal army with its large military resources into the de facto Serbian army. The Croatian authorities' hesitation to confront this army reinforced this image. The Croatian leadership sought international support, and the devastation wrought in Krajina helped provoke this international intervention (Hislope, 1996). The Croatian authorities reciprocated with the barbarian stereotype prism towards the Serbs: a threatener superior in capability and inferior in culture. With the provoked barbarian capable of genocidal cruelty, the defender must attract the intervention of external allies (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The Croats together with the international community in the opening phase of the war appeared unwilling and unable to act decisively against the Serbs while attempting to negotiate a cease-fire.

Finally, Cottam and Cottam (2001) argue that the Serbs saw the opportunity to enhance the nation's grandeur. They would achieve what the Great Powers and the Communists had historically and, in their view, unjustly denied them. International denial of a Serb nation attaining territorial unification was a source of old Serb grievances. Serbs believed that territorial unification was a great power promise which the great powers did not keep (Pavkovic, 2002). The rhetorical explanation by which the Serbs justified their actions to themselves was their necessity to protect Serbian lives. It derived from the powerful imagery of their ugly history of genocidal conflict. In sum, whether Tudjman wanted it or not, war was on, in an effort to redefine the borders of Croatia and Serbia (Cottam and Cottam, 2001).

Cottam and Cottam (2001) conclude that the postwar difficulties inherent in transforming national identity are evident from the civil wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union. Strategies relying on coercion to destroy national identity only work temporarily. Not threatening national identities

while offering an additional common identity, as in Yugoslavia, is the other extreme. It apparently needs generations of time and prosperity, in order to succeed. Charismatic or at least legitimate leadership and symbols may be necessity for the success of such a strategy, or at least it will benefit greatly from it. In short, people must want to live together, if not as a nation, then as a state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The analysis of multinational states has an additional example of vulnerability to international intervention in Yugoslavia. Recognition of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia was one form of the important role which other countries played in the breakup of Yugoslavia (Coughlan, 2016). Germany's early recognition was particularly important because it could only heighten Serb recollections of and sensitivities to the alliance between Croatian fascist Ustashe and Hitler's Germany (Raju, 1997).

Post-Soviet Russia

Cottam and Cottam (2001) argue that the situation for the Russians was different. In the USSR, the Russians had a republic in which the overwhelming majority of Russians resided. A Serbian complaint was that the Communist authorities had denied only them a territory roughly complementary to the nation as one of the constituent nations within the sovereign state. In addition, Russia had been an empire with boundaries that fluctuated under the Czars. Consequently, at the periphery of the Russian nation, where exactly Russia stopped was unclear even for Russians (Martinez, 2013). If broad agreement on a territorial boundary had existed, and the secession of republics of USSR was violating that boundary, then the likelihood of violent resistance would have been significant, but no violence occurred. By the early 1990s, 25 million ethnic Russians now lived outside Russia in the Soviet successor states. This fact would become an issue in future Russian foreign policy. The view of radical Russian nationalists where Russia ends is different. Some have desired a return to an empire which Russia controls. What they perceive to be the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the nation's land has clearly become an issue which they press in the Russian foreign policy process (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The fact that in neither the SFRY nor the USSR case did full-scale war occur to preserve the multinational state is the central point. Full-scale war did occur to achieve nationalist aims which multinational authoritarian state control strategies had thwarted. As Yugoslavia disintegrated, the case of Serbia demonstrated this pattern. The reality of Russian identity became clear when the USSR began to disintegrate even though political actors often considered Russia and the USSR coterminous. Russia was not coterminous with the USSR. Russia itself, under Yeltsin's leadership, left the Soviet Union in June 1990 (Cottam and Cottam, 2001).

Putin's ruling coalition includes also Russia workers from urban and rural levels together with members of the security, police and military services. Capital concentrations focused on post-Soviet nouveau riche factions supportive of the post-Soviet security clique (Galeotti, 2021). Moscow's ruling coalition shares the common bond of Russian irredentist nationalism particularly towards the Slavic republics. While previously balancing conflicting pragmatic and revisionist pressures, Putin increasing gravitated towards the more militant wing of Greater Russia advocacy on the eve of the Ukraine invasion (Troianovski, 2022).

Post-Soviet Ukraine

Ukraine more closely corresponds with the Weberian ideal-typical category of being a multi-ethnic, Ukrainian core community state (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The core group committed to sovereignty of the state are Ukrainian primary terminal self-identifiers, i.e., Ukrainian nationalists. They apparently had been the modal component of the 44 million Soviet-era population. The community identity profile complexity in post-Soviet Ukraine implies that the mobilization base among the population is weaker than, for example, in the neighboring Polish nation state. Politically significant components of the Slavic population historically were attracted to neighboring Russia. The intensity of this attraction varied.

In the more than 30 years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the influence of the Ukrainian nationalist constituency has been politically disproportionately influential. Parliamentary election support of avowedly

nationalist parties has been quite small. The Ukrainian case illustrates the disproportionate influence of nationalists in part because of comparatively intense self-mobilization capacity. Prior to 2022, the overall, collective strength of Ukrainian nationalism appears not to have been sufficient to undertake far-reaching economic reforms, unlike in neighboring Poland. "In Ukraine, unlike Poland and Czechoslovakia (but also unlike Russia), there had been no attempt at real reform after the fall of communism" (Mikloš, 2021, 52). The first post-Communist government's commitment to reforming Poland included the adoption of the so-called economic shock therapy approach in the Balcerowicz plan. US economists, particularly Jeffrey Sachs, played a high-profile role in advising a government committed and capable to implement far-reaching economic reform (Matynia, 2019). The post-Soviet Ukrainian authorities, in contrast, have been comparatively slow in implementing economic reforms that would rupture trade networks inherited from the Soviet era. Ukrainian nationalists would seek to maintain the territorial resources that the Soviet legacy had bequeathed to them. One of the political functions of Soviet-era republic boundary creation was to undercut the propensity towards nationalism among the peoples of the old Russian empire. Persuading core nationalist constituencies among these peoples that the Soviet Union was not a neo-colonial de facto Russian core culture state was one critical aim. It would prove to be an insurmountable challenge.

Tactical policies included allocating territories with significant Russophile populations to the respective territories of republics neighboring the Russian republic. This ultimately unsuccessful aim to ameliorate minority national group vulnerabilities towards perceiving neo-colonial Russian designs extended of course into other areas as well. The Russian republic, for example, was not permitted to have its own formal republican Communist party structure or its own republic KGB as did the other republics until the rise of Yeltsin (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). Russian nationalists in the later Soviet period came to view the Soviet state has unjustly repressive of Russian political national representation. They displayed this view of the state as parallel to Serb nationalist perceptions of the Yugoslav state.

Despite these long-term Soviet and Yugoslav de facto nation building strategies, these two multinational states disintegrated concomitantly with their democratization. Their dissolution indicated that Soviet and Yugoslav territorial identity failed to supersede ethnic national identity. The Soviet legacy of ethnic, sectarian, territorial identity complexity in the post-Soviet era included a strong Russophile component in Ukraine. The attraction of Ukraine nationalists towards integration with so-called Euro-Atlantic structures for their own nation state building project has been strong. Moscow's 2014 and 2022 interventions aimed functionally to obstruct this high-level strategic goal of Ukrainian nationalism. The 2014 intervention removed a substantial component of the Russophile population from the Ukrainian polity. It thereby functionally strengthened the influence of Ukrainian nationalism in the remaining territory. This strengthening generated a Russian nationalist response in Moscow, culminating in the Russian 2022 full-scale intervention. Moscow has been condemning the functional, inevitable disproportionate influence of Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Soviet Ukrainian state. Ukrainian nationalism has been sufficiently strong to limit the policy option range of the Zelenskyy government. The latter had been unable to implement the Minsk Accords for reintegrating Donetsk and Luhansk in a confederal Ukrainian system. Moves to do so generated demonstrations that threaten the government's stability. "On 1 October 2019, President Zelensky announced that Ukraine was agreeing to the "Steinmeier formula" as a means of kick-starting the peace process. According to this plan, proposed in 2016 by then–Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany, Ukraine would hold OSCE-supervised elections in the separatist "republics" [in the Donbass] and grant them "special status" after the vote. Zelensky's announcement was met in Ukraine with harsh criticism and accusations of capitulation" (Shevtsova, 2020, 145-146). The Yanukovych administration utilized deadly force to suppress these actors but failed to do so. These pro-Euro-Atlantic forces had the open support of US and EU representatives (Cohen, 2014, Snider, 2022). Putin's verbal characterizations of the Ukrainian government under the control of neo-Nazis apparently equates Ukrainian nationalism as antithetical to Russian identity (Tipaldou and Casula, 2019).

Russian Foreign Policy Motivation Under Putin

In the 30 years subsequent to the collapse of the USSR, a push towards integration of component elements of the old Soviet Union into US-led North Atlantic international institutions emerged (Menon and Ruger, 2020). Moscow's prevailing view had presumed that the former Soviet territories were part of what Moscow recently has labelled as the so-called Russian World, i.e., its sphere of influence in the "near abroad" (Harned, 2022, 4). The attraction of integration of those former Soviet components towards the North Atlantic institutions threatens Russian national security as well as Russian national identity values. Table 12 shows the author's inference regarding the motivational formula source of Russian foreign policy towards Ukraine in February 2022. The importance of understanding the ultimate sources of a foreign policy target's belligerency in international relations is critical as events subsequent to the 1938 Munich conference illustrate. The framework in this paper highlights the importance of explicating and testing the assumptions regarding the motivations for a target's belligerency in strategically formulating a response. It is a necessary component for an effective conflict resolution strategy. The construction of tests within foreign policy is needed to check the validity of these inferences. The author's inference of the motivation formula for Russian foreign policy behavior towards Ukraine and the so-called West produces a foreign policy motivation similar to that in Table 2. It appears similar to that perceived foreign policy motivation formula that was the foundation of the ill-fated appeasement strategy towards 1938 Germany. The author infers that Russian foreign policy aims support political strategic goals that are as of this writing much more limited than those of 1938 Hitlerian Germany. Whereas the latter aspired to world domination, 2022 Putin's Russia aspires to contain further expansion of US hegemony into the former Soviet Union's Slavic heartland. In the prevailing Russian February 2022 worldview, the more indirect forms of American expansion in the postwar nuclear setting include so-called Europeanization. The February 2022 Russian foreign policy motivation formula was the following:

Table 12: The Author's Inferred Understanding of Russia's Foreign Policy Motivation in February 2022

70%	A)	National dignity National unity-irredentism
20%	B)	Personal power -- internal 　　Bureaucratic vested interests 　　　Survival of the regime
10%	C)	Defense 　Economic vested interests

Source: DeDominicis, 2022, adapted from Cottam, 1977; Cottam, 1994; Cottam and Cottam, 2001 Interwar appeasement aimed to pacify Hitlerian Germany on the basis of the mistaken inference Berlin's foreign policy motivation formula. Thereby Germany would presumably transform into a status quo power rather than risk the horrendous costs of a repeat of the Great War. Appeasement failed because the inferred motivation for Germany belligerency was fundamentally flawed. A portrayal of Russian foreign policy motivation more in accordance with appeasement's assumptions is more plausible; the entire GDP of Russia is equivalent to that of Italy. A détente strategy aims to eliminate the misperceptual basis of a conflict spiral while avoiding encouragement of misperceptual tendencies to view compromises as demonstrating lack of capacity to mobilize to resist expansion, while US post 1989 expansion is global.

The Putin regime's harnessing and selective co-optation of the oligarchs reflects the downgrading of economic vested interests as a foreign policy driver. The question of whether to accommodate Moscow's irredentist demands is also a relative power capability issue. As a result of negative and positive economic pressure incentives Moscow placed on Ukraine, Yanukovych in 2013 declined to sign a trade association agreement with the EU (BBC, 2014a, Houiex, 2022). Yanukovych attempted to placate his eastern supporters centered in the Donbas. Moscow violently intervened in Ukraine in 2014 after US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland, US Senator John McCain and EU representative Catherine Ashton publicly accompanied and encouraged the protests. The violent police response to them intensified polarizations that led to the flight of Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych (DW, 2013, BBC, 2014a, Guardian, 2013, Waterfield, 2014). Western actors functionally assume that those eastern constituencies are threats to Western interests. The perceptual basis of the Ukraine crisis in February 2022 included a perceived threat from the North Atlantic community. The prevailing view in Moscow perceived the EU as

an imperial danger, with superior cultural development in the twenty-first century. Moscow's self-perceived power capacity equivalencies lie in its trade commodities along with itsmilitary and security instruments. Supplying and supporting these security and force instruments requires maintenance of a technological capacity comparable to any other state actor. Among prevailing Russian polity worldviews, these force instruments hold critical symbolic representational status for Russian nationalism. They are the core institutions of the post-Communist Russian nation state. The Russian communist party does not have a comparable status. The Russian Orthodox Church has gained symbolic representational status through its elevation by the post-Communist Russian state leadership. It is a dependent actor in the Russian polity, i.e., it is not a threat to Putin. The Serbian Orthodox Church was comparably more skeptical of Slobodan Milosevic, favoring rather the Bosnian Serb leadership (Mojzes, 1998).

Moscow's prevailing view of the cultural superiority of the West outside of control and force technologies results in social creativity that emphasizes traditional values. It manifests itself in creating alternative, parallel structures, e.g., the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Larson, 2020). By creating and promoting de facto alternative civilizational claims with these institutional representations, Moscow and Beijing respond to the perceived challenge of the West (Owen, 2020). Moscow's twenty-first century foreign policy behavior increasingly appears to parallel patterns that Soviet Moscow displayed. Comparison with the West, while manifesting perceived threat imperial threat from the West, leads to social competition and social creativity.

Unlike the Serbian Federated Socialist Republic in Tito's Yugoslavia, the Russian Social Federated Republic was not permitted to create its own republic-level Communist Party. Pan-Yugoslav Serbian nationalist self-identification with the Serbian republic was more feasible to develop around this ruling party republic institutional structure. Russian internal Soviet diaspora populations in the Ukrainian republic were incentivized to self-identify with the Soviet state. Recognition that ultimate power laid in the party and police structures contrasted with the absence of a Russian republic-level Communist party and secret police entities. De facto Russification of the Soviet state developed. Higher language education policy and de facto Slavic predominance in the components of the coercive apparatus reflected this Russian core community de facto function. It encouraged compensatory internal Russophone diaspora self-identification with the Soviet state (Yapıcı, 2022). The disintegration of the USSR left external Russophone diaspora identity in comparatively fluid condition. European Union integration encouraged state building around the republic borders inherited from the Soviet era. Russophone elements within Ukraine faced inducements to self-identify with the titular nation exercising the core community function of the post-Soviet non-nation state. The rise of Putin and the so-called men of the forces in Russia encouraged the rise of Russian nationalism around the core bureaucratic components inherited from the Soviet-era control system (Kanet, 2021). These constituencies were more prone to equate Russian ethnic identity with Soviet-era institutional representations, specifically the coercive instrument bureaucracies. European integration is a threat to traditional Russian self-identification with Kiev insofar as it encourages post-Soviet fluid Russian identity to integrate with Ukraine. As the current violence continues and intensifies, a greater likelihood emerges of interethnic polarization between Ukrainian and Russian self-identifiers within Ukraine. Forced population separation and movements become more likely.

To redirect these trends prior to 2022, integration of Belarus, Ukraine and Russia with a focus on constitutional restructuring of Ukraine would have been necessary. In this scenario, the Minsk Accords would have been implemented, and Ukraine would have recognized the loss of Crimea. The Ukrainian government should have permitted dual citizenship to permit Ukrainian-Russian participation in both Ukrainian and Russian elections. Precedents elsewhere are extensive, including in Bulgaria and Turkey regarding the Bulgarian Turkish diaspora in Turkey (DeDominicis, 2011). They vote in both Bulgarian and Turkish elections. The refusal of Kiev to permit dual citizenship indicates that the prevailing view prior to 2022 did see a threat from pan-Russian irredentism. It assumed that pan-Russian minorities will respond positively to these irredentist appeals from Moscow. European integration is about liberal nation state

building in Europe, functionally propagating liberal nation state integration of European states. It attracts Ukrainian Russophones, and Russian nationalists see Russian national self-identity as under threat.

The crippling of the Russian economy and the decimation of the Russian middle class would likely increase the intensity of Russian nationalism. The authorities will functionally rely on the latter to compensate for the decline in constituencies' utilitarian economic prosperity provision due to the war and international sanctions (Cottam and Gallucci, 1978). Authoritarian populism will increasingly characterize the regime further with the EU portrayed as a threat to traditional Russian values. The Russian Orthodox Church is articulating this narrative of archetypes and stereotypes of self, versus other (Horowitz, 2022). In this scenario, Russian public opinion will increasingly transfer their aspirations to the international influence expansion achievements of the Russian state. It will parallel political value trends in 1930s Germany. If not annexation of the Baltic states, the likelihood increases of foreign policy aims focusing on partition and annexation of territory of other post-Soviet states. Journalistic reports as of June 2022 describe "Russia" as "gripped by increasingly aggressive nationalism" (Bigg et al., 2022, para. 25).

A critical differentiator between Moscow and Belgrade in terms of their irredentist foreign policy behavior is their self-perceived relative capability regarding the international system. The prevailing view in Moscow is that it perceives itself as a great power, i.e., a state with a sufficient comparative power potential base to establish its foreign policy aims autonomously. Great powers perceive themselves as having a policy option range set by their own capabilities and their willingness to expend them. Their policy options are not ultimately determined by the regional foreign policy aims of more powerful external actors. Belgrade's prevailing view functionally assumed that the Western great powers lacked the incentive to view the Yugoslav crisis as worthy of significant resource expenditures. To intervene effectively would require political controversy and resource commitments. Serbia, as a nationalistic polity, was prone to stereotyping of the external environment's actors to achieve its objectives.

Belgrade miscalculated. the West eventually came to view Belgrade's coercive policies towards the other former Yugoslav republics as a source of challenge (Gonzalez, 2017). Public criticism of the perceived post-Cold War inefficacy and relevance of NATO as violence escalated in the Balkans generated an American nationalist response (Cottam and Cottam, 2001). The Cold War containment instruments, a consumer of vast governmental budget allocations since the late 1940s, portrayed themselves as agents of international peace. In this ultimately self-serving worldview, this peace came via benign American hegemony which these institutions administered (Jones, 2016). The US domestic political threat to these vested interests stemmed from the Balkan wars' instigation of debate over the continued relevance of these vested interests from the containment era. 1990s US-led Western military intervention in the Balkans utilizing ideological human rights justifications of national self-determination generated skeptical responses from Russian academics at the time (Utkin, 2000).

Serbia had the greatest proportion of its national population becoming minorities in sovereign states dominated by historical adversaries. Belgrade's contribution to systemic violations of humanitarian law from the ensuing chaotic violence was arguably the greatest, but it was not the only party guilty of nationalist irredentism. Serbia's historically allied with Moscow while Germany-oriented Croatia and Slovenia could more effectively appeal to NATO vested interests. The US declared Serbia the guilty party predominantly responsible for the violence while the EU sought initially to keep a neutral position and attempted to enforce an arms embargo (Jovic, 2006). NATO then expanded its role and influence into so-called peacemaking operations, going beyond its original mission of containing the Soviet Union. The vast US national security establishment that developed during the Cold War now found a new mission in the post-Cold War international environment. A critical component of this mission was the expansion of US-led NATO influence into eastern Europe. The prevailing view in Yeltsin's Moscow lacked the perceived power capability and the intensity of perceived threat to contain and prevent NATO expansion. Elements within the Russian security establishment did perceive such a threat. Russian peacekeeping units

spontaneously rushed from Bosnia to the Prishtina airport in Kosovo at the conclusion of the US-led bombing campaign (Hughes, 2013). This action was evidence of such a view among certain Moscow constituencies. The prevailing worldview in Moscow shifted its direction with the rise and dominance of Putin and the so-called siloviki, i.e., the forces personnel. They became the dominant constituency in the Russian regime, eclipsing and subduing the heretofore autonomous business oligarchs.

For the siloviki, maintenance of their control is significantly dependent upon their primary drive to redraw the inherited Soviet legacy borders to encompass Russian minorities and territory. They share that motivation with the Yugoslav state coercive control instruments as Milosevic progressively Serbianized them during the opening phase of the Yugoslav wars. The Putin administration relies on these Soviet-legacy vested bureaucratic interests throughout the former Soviet Union to be the constituency foundation for Russian irredentism. These vested interests include economic as well as bureaucratic control instruments. Europeanization of Ukraine threatens these vested economic and bureaucratic instruments by reorienting them towards the North Atlantic community. The business oligarchs will more likely swing in their allegiance in reaction to perceived profit-making opportunities in addition to applied coercion. The bureaucratic control vested interests are the foundational constituency of this regime. They functionally aim to harness the business elite. This control becomes more vulnerable if these network periphery areas as in Ukraine come under North Atlantic hegemony. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko relies on these similar post-Soviet bureaucratic control instruments to remain in power. The relatively stronger influence of Ukrainian nationalism centered in the western regions is more influential in Kiev. Belarusian identity is more a creation of the Soviet era, making these vested coercive control apparatus instruments the dominant political constituency for his regime (Shraibman, 2018). Ukrainian president Victor Yanukovych "gained considerable power regarding the selection and dismissal of judges in 2010." Before the start of the war, Zelenskyy moved to increase the power of the executive over the legislature (Minakov, 2021, 96).

A PATH FORWARD

As of June 2022, news reports imply that as the evolving crisis continues, Moscow may acquiesce to the partition of Ukraine with the unoccupied nationalist core joining the European Union. In return, Moscow would presumably seek reintegration into global trade and commerce flows. Putin continued to castigate the EU for its submission to serving Washington's influence expansion strategy. He made a distinction between Moscow accepting that Ukraine can join the EU as "the sovereign decision of any country," while continuing to reject Ukraine's integration into NATO (Troianovski, Kramer and Levenson, 2022). An increasingly probably outcome is the violent partition of post-Soviet Ukraine as forced population movements amidst war crimes and violence continues. Formulation of frameworks for ceasefire agreements might focus on possible historical strategic models. They include the various, pre-1995 Dayton plans for the constitutional reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They would require a partnership between the EU, NATO and Russia along with the UN Security Council (China). Restructuring of the Ukrainian constitution would appeal to those vested economic and bureaucratic interests in Russia that would like to maintain their post-Soviet networks. They would also have additional opportunities to integrate with Western-based business networks. It would also appeal to national dignity demands of Moscow by providing equality partnership status with Brussels in managing the de facto international protectorate over Ukraine. De facto partition occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the US refused to support the UN-EU/Vance-Owen plan in the United Nations Security Council (Burg and Shoup, 1999). The US chose instead to place most of the blame and responsibility on the Serbs for the violence there (Hartwell, 2019). As a result, the violence continued to escalate to genocidal levels. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues as a legal entity, but the willingness of the Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs to cooperate remains weak, and Bosnia is slowly unravelling, according to the International Crisis Group (2014). The EU increased its peacekeeping troop deployments to Bosnia on the eve of the Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine (Rettman and Zalan, 2022). EU strategy continues to emphasize political stabilization within internationally

recognized borders rather than accommodating nationalism to proactively restructure sovereignty boundaries (DeDominicis, 2018b).

Russia has vastly more diplomatic bargaining leverage towards the US and the EU than Serbia did or does. Ukrainian nationalists would likely oppose this restructuring with its de facto loss of sovereignty. Their political influence over the US and EU is limited. As the violence escalates along with its consequent fear and hatred, the conflict will increasingly become in effect zero sum. It will lead to maximalist solutions of population expulsion and de facto partition that in the world witnessed in Bosnia and Kosovo. Large numbers of Ukrainians have extensive family and economic interests extending throughout much of Russia as well as Ukraine so they would lose much due to ethnic cleansing and de facto partition. They are a political constituency foundation for a ceasefire agreement and subsequent peace settlement. Conflict dynamics may escalate out of control so that compromise becomes increasingly politically difficult every day that the war continues as more people flee and more people die. Militant Ukrainian nationalists do not want to forsake the vast resources that the Soviet-era republic boundaries gave to their state. Those Soviet-era drawn boundaries, as with the 1940s-era drawn boundaries in Yugoslavia, were drawn by the Communist authorities for a number of political aims. They included reducing the perceived political power and influence of the respective largest national groups in those 2 federations: the Russians and the Serbs.

Presently, powerful countries have condemned Russia's act and imposed sanctions and supplied weapons to Kyiv, but their ultimate political aim is unclear. Direct conflict with Moscow is to be avoided at all costs. A determination of their effectiveness requires a conceptualization of the desired future that the EU and the US seek to actualize. The sanctions can then more readily be evaluated as to their effectiveness. Apparently, a functional aim of the Biden administration for the outcome of this crisis to include the removal of Putin in Moscow. Milosevic was ousted in Serbia, but Serbia is vastly weaker than Russia.

Escalation Potential to Direct Great Power Conflict

Comparable historical analogies are more likely are the outbreak of the First World War. Russia, like Austria-Hungary, is seeking to be seen as a first-rate global power and wants its influence over the former Soviet republics (if not the Baltic states) confirmed. The prevailing view in Moscow seeks derivative opportunity to restore its global status by illustrating its dominance over a Ukraine it views and degenerate and weak. Moscow may have underestimated the overall prevailing intensity of Ukrainian nationalism. Nationalists typically, whether American or Russian or Ukrainian, tend to stereotype their foreign policy targets and overestimate their relative power capabilities.

Russian-China Alliance

China could play a mediating role through the UN. Effective Mediators utilize their power leverage while pursuing their own national interests to bring the contestants to the view that their conflict has evolved into a "hurting stalemate" (Zartman and Touval, 2007, 445). In sum, the respective prevailing view evolve among all contestants to infer that their respective interests will suffer more damage by continuing the conflict than by reaching a peace settlement. China might mediate but it will want something in return for this mediation from the US and the EU. China would likely demand US concessions on China's irredentist claims regarding Taiwan. Washington may not want China to mediate given emerging dominant threats that perceive China as a threatening, imperialist challenger that in the long term is more problematic than Russia. Shifting prevailing views in Moscow towards favoring a ceasefire requires shaping the prevailing view in Moscow. This prevailing view focuses on the ultimate perceived foreign policy motivations towards Moscow of the other great powers. Should Moscow's prevailing view include achieving maximal, achievable objectives in Ukraine as necessary to sustain the Moscow regime, then the war will likely continue. This analysis suggested that the Ukraine conflict ultimately derives from a conflict spiral focused on Washington and Moscow as a critical factor. The intensity of perceived threat from Washington

correlates with this predisposition to stereotype the Ukraine war as a life-or-death struggle for Russia. The comparative historical analogies with the lead up to the First World War include Germany allowing Austria much autonomy in its foreign policy by solidifying its alliance with Vienna. Russia, in the role of Austria, may view itself as having this Chinese support because China has few friends in the US-led containment approach to China in Asia and the world. Russia plays a useful role for China as leverage towards Washington. Concomitantly, the escalating conflict between Washington and Beijing can increasingly reduce the salience of this lever for Washington to restrain US containment moves towards Beijing. It can reinforce US containment efforts towards Beijing as the prevailing view in Washington shifts towards a Cold War-type bifurcation of international relations into two opposing camps.

These two competing alliances are headed by Washington and Beijing, respectively. By way of historical analogy, Austria in 1914 functionally obtained isolated Berlin's underwriting of Vienna's policy towards the western Balkans. In its strategy towards Ukraine, Moscow may be constructing its strategy assuming an immutable close alliance with China. A plausible conflict spiral escalation development for the Ukraine crisis involves scenarios over Western recognition of Taiwan. Washington's increasingly intense perception of challenge may lead to the inference that Moscow would not prosecute its extended attack on Ukraine without Chinese support. This inference may reinforce attitudinal trends to contain China through recognizing Taiwan. This horizontal scenario is in addition to accidental vertical escalation through military mishaps in the nuclear setting. Serbian nationalists' assassinating the Austrian archduke in 1914 aimed directly at the nature of the target state and its regime, a multinational, increasingly unstable empire. A prevailing view may be increasingly evident in Washington that Communist China enables post-Soviet Moscow's violent imperialism. Officially recognizing the sovereignty of liberal democratic Taiwan, Washington's Cold War ally, would increasingly likely be perceived as vital. It would be viewed as part of a containment policy that strikes at the ultimate enabler of imperialist totalitarian great power violence.

De-escalation scenarios may focus on the EU and the UN, i.e., Russia, US and China, overseeing the implementation of the new constitutional institution-building process in post-Soviet Ukraine. Upon reaching a ceasefire agreement, peacekeeping forces from the EU, the OSCE, and the UN would be deployed, which would of course include Russian and US military personnel. In this scenario, Ukraine would be neutral, i.e., it would never join NATO and the EU. Functionally, the EU and Russia would enter into a de facto partnership to oversee the governance of a Ukraine not fully sovereign. For this proposal to succeed it needs to be implemented before genocidal attacks to expel forcibly mass populations become essentially irreversible. It needs to be implemented immediately, and its feasibility already is questionable. Otherwise, zero-sum conflict dynamics will predominate. The increasingly likely functional political outcome will be de facto partition along with forced, massive population expulsions. This outcome is what occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the international community proved unable to intervene to restructure the constitution of disintegrating Socialist Yugoslavia. The US placed most of the blame and responsibility on Belgrade for the violence. The violence continued to escalate to genocidal levels. Bosnia and Herzegovina continues today to be a legal entity. The willingness of the Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs to cooperate is functionally stalemated, and the 1995 Dayton Accords are slowly "unravelling," according to the International Crisis Group (2022, para. 4).

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The goal of this paper is to explicate and outline in systematic, comparable form the assumptions underpinning Russian and Western foreign policy strategy regarding Ukraine in February 2022. This analysis proposes that the primary sources of Russian belligerency lie ultimately in perceived stereotyped threat to Russian national unification and self-determination from Washington and its allies. Comparisons are made with the impact of Serbian nationalist irredentism in the violent disintegration of post-Cold War Yugoslavia. This comparison illustrates the critical salience of irredentist nationalism as a state-level communal foreign policy motivation. It challenges international political systemic functional preferences

for stabilization of Communist-era legacy interstate borders of newly sovereign states. This paper compares the Serbian post-Tito and German interwar irredentism with Post-Soviet Russia. Its framework highlights critical differences for constructing an effective strategic conflict resolution strategy regarding Ukraine in 2022. Moscow perceived a derivative opportunity to contain the so-called threatening West in Ukraine. Moscow self-servingly stereotyped the latter lesser power as degenerate as reflected in its Kyiv's vulnerability to the attractions of the West.

The limitations of the paper lie in accommodating the fluidity within the political dynamics among constituencies in the Russian polity since the invasion in February 2022. In sum, the paper does not provide an analysis of the correlation of political forces within Russian policy making circles. It does imply that an overemphasis on the individual will of Vladimir Putin is itself a manifestation of stereotyping of Russia as a diabolical enemy. Directions for future research include the praxis potential for differentiating Brussels from Washington within the prevailing view in Moscow. As of July 2022, news reports imply that as the evolving crisis continues, Moscow may acquiesce to the partition of Ukraine with the unoccupied nationalist core joining the European Union. In return, Moscow would presumably seek reintegration into global trade and commerce flows centered on Europe. Moscow has publicly affirmed its commitment to Eurasia as its alternative to economic integration with the North Atlantic integration. Power imbalances between Russia and China incentivize Russia maintaining and developing its diplomatic bargaining leverage with the North Atlantic community over the long term.

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